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THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND

A Brief Account of the Strategy and Grand
Tactics of the War

SECOND AND REVISED EDITION

BY

CAPTAIN F. R. SEDGWICK

Royal Field Artillery

LONDON:

FORSTER GROOM & CO., LTD.

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EXTRACTS FROM PRESS OPINIONS ON THE
FIRST EDITION

"Captain F. R. Sedgwick has executed a useful work in preparing a treatise in brief form on 'The Russo-Japanese War on Land.' The account of the operations, though brief, is accurate, and gives a reasonable view of every thing that happened. It discusses the tactics employed. It is a well-written treatise."—*Army Navy Gazette*.

"Gives an excellent account of the actual events in 'The Russo-Japanese War.' Where the value of the work lies is in the various criticisms on the strategy and tactics of both sides, as voiced by competent military critics, such as Major Löffler, of the Royal Saxon General Staff, and General Negrier, of the French General Staff."—*Broad Arrow*.

"It is admirably lucid and succinct, and has maps of all the principal battles. It concludes with a valuable chapter, entitled 'Some Lessons of the War,' in which the author gives expert French and German opinion, as well as British opinion. This is quite an interesting book for the ordinary reader as well as for the expert."—*The Field*.

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"Will be found exceedingly useful to the students of military tactics."—*Portsmouth Times*.

"This little work will doubtless be of great value, as regards military strategy, to all officers in His Majesty's Army. The work is illustrated by some very excellent maps."—*Western Morning News*.

"A clear, succinct and cleverly compiled record of the whole campaign."—*United Service Gazette*.

"Gives a comprehensive and creditable account of the long and intricate operations, accompanied by criticism and comment, while a number of maps or diagrams show the various scenes of operations and the position of the combatants."—*London and China Telegraph*.

"Small, useful and compact volume—an excellent outline of events of the war clearly expounded, and his conclusions are enriched and supported by quotations from the criticisms of well-known Continental experts. The volume is printed in excellent type and contains many maps. Will be valuable to students of this campaign."—*The Green Tiger*.

"Students will be well advised to take note of an unpretentious little volume, entitled 'The Russo-Japanese War on Land.' The work is rigorously condensed."—*Times of India*.

"Is of substantial interest and value to military students."—*The Bookseller*.

"A brief account of the strategy and major tactics of the war, with good maps."—*The Outlook*.

P R E F A C E

THE reception accorded to the first edition of this book has shown that it met a need—the need of a brief summary of the main events of a most remarkable war. Few have time or opportunity to study in detail a great war. Many desire to study some portion of it, and require a brief account of the whole before commencing a detailed study of the part. Others merely desire a general account ; but the fact that some such book is in demand is shown by the reception accorded to the first. The present edition is, it is hoped, an improvement, though for reasons of expense new Maps have not been prepared. The works consulted in the preparation to the book are :—

LA GUERRE RUSSO-JAPONAISE, - - - *Meunier*
DER RUSSISCH-JAPANISCHE KRIEG, - - - *Löffler*
A STAFF OFFICER'S SCRAP BOOK, - *Sir Ian Hamilton*
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR—PART I., - - - *War Office*
PAPERS IN VARIOUS MILITARY JOURNALS, ENGLISH
AND FOREIGN, PARTICULARLY MILITÄR-WOCHEN-
BLATT AND REVUE MILITAIRE DES ARMÉES
ÉTRANGÈRES.

Such criticisms on the campaign as the book contains are almost entirely taken from the books and papers named above.

Few wars of the past are of such interest to the British people as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, for one belligerent obtained and maintained complete control on sea, and the issue was then fought out on land. Japan's very heart was menaced by danger to Korea. What could she have done without an army equal to the task before it? No fleet could have availed against the hosts of Russia. Yet Japan, like England, is an island.

F. R. SEDGWICK.

EXETER, *4th February*, 1908.

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THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND

CHAPTER I

THE OPPOSING FORCES—THE THEATRE OF WAR—
THE FIRST OPERATIONS—BATTLE OF THE YALU

JAPAN emerged from a sleep of centuries in the middle sixties, and took from that time the shape of a modern Power. She created a navy trained by British officers, and an army trained by French and Germans, and tested this newly-acquired military strength in a war with China, whose ill-disciplined levies and ill-found battleships she disposed of without difficulty.

For centuries Russia has been slowly and surely extending her dominions across Asia, and the progress had been very rapid in the last fifty years of the nineteenth century. Except on the South, Russia had become the nearest neighbour of the Chinese Empire, and not unnaturally exercised great influence in Peking.

After the Chino-Japanese War, it was Russia and Germany that prevented Japan from reaping

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full fruits of her victory, and by the Treaty of the Simonoseki, Port Arthur, a naval base of China, captured by Japan, was ceded back to China.

It was not long after this that Russia leased Port Arthur herself, and constructed a railway from thence through Manchuria to join her trans-continental system. To guard this railway, troops were placed on the line, consisting not only of railway guards, but also of field troops. Russia also completed her trans-continental railway, and thus became a more and more important factor in the Far East.

The Government of the Czar was, it is true, under pledge to evacuate Manchuria, but the time to do so seemed to be far away, and meanwhile the Russians were pressing upon Korea from the north, and their activities seemed to clearly foreshadow the absorption of this country also—a country which had seemed destined to find employment for the surplus Japanese population, and is also placed in such a position as to be strategically of vital importance to Japan.

There is no doubt that the whole of the Japanese people fully realised that a war, sooner or later, with Russia was inevitable; every book about Japan—and there are hundreds of them—referred to this event as inevitable in the near future. It seems probable, on the other hand, that the Russian diplomatists in St. Petersburg never really believed that the Japanese would dare to assail them, so overwhelming appeared the strength of Russia.

A glance at the map will show that Japan was justified in fearing the Russian menace. Korea juts out towards Japan like a dagger held towards her heart, should it be held by an enemy.

At first sight, the forces on either side appeared to be impossibly unequal. On sea it is true that Japan had a small superiority of strength in the Pacific, but Russia had a great naval force, sufficient to put the balance far over to her side, in European waters. On land, Japan had increased her forces after the Chinese War to thirteen Active Divisions, two Cavalry, and two Field Artillery Brigades, thirteen Reserve Brigades, and a Home defence force of about 100 battalions. The strength is given in more detail in the Appendix. Russia's Army is counted in millions, and her Army Corps by the score.

In resources, too, Japan seemed equally out-matched, for the vast wealth of the Russian Empire should stand almost any drain that could conceivably be put upon it, while Japan is a poor country. But looked at more closely, it is at once seen that the forces were not so disproportionate as appeared at first sight.

Russia's actual force east of Lake Baikal in the early part of 1904 consisted only of, Active Troops, 96 battalions, 35 squadrons, and 244 guns, and Reserve Troops, 32 battalions and 17 batteries; the permanent troops of the fortresses at Vladivostok, Possiet Bay and Port Arthur; and about 30,000

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Railway and Boundary Guards, which would expand to about 42,000 to 45,000 on mobilisation.

This force was distributed as follows :—

1. In Ussuri about Vladivostok—

- 4 Brigades of East Siberian Rifles.
- 2 Regiments of Cossacks.
- 1 Sapper Battalion.
- 14 Batteries.

Besides Fortress Artillery and engineers, etc.

Total Field Troops—48 battalions, 12 squadrons, 112 guns.

2. In Kuantung Peninsula and Southern Manchuria—

- 3 Brigades East Siberian Rifles.
- 1 Brigade Cossacks.
- 2 Battalions Sappers.
- 5 Batteries.

Besides Fortress Artillery Companies and technical troops.

Total Field Troops—30 battalions, 12 squadrons, 40 guns.

3. Southwards of Harbin on the railway—

- 1 Brigade East Siberian Rifles.
- 1 Brigade Cossacks.
- 2 Batteries.

Total—8 battalions, 11 squadrons, 12 guns.

4. Railway Troops—24 Companies.

5. Frontier Guards—55 Companies, 55 squadrons, 48 guns (6 batteries).

The total combatant strength of these troops, includ-

ing Railway, Frontier and Fortress Troops, would, at Russian War Establishment strength, amount to 148,800 men, the Field Troops to 106,200, but to mobilise them would take a very long time, and it is known that at the commencement of the campaign the strength of a battalion was only about 700, of a squadron 100, and on this basis the Field Troops only amounted to some 80,000 with 25 batteries (196 guns).¹

To reinforce this Army the only line of communication available was the Siberian Railway, more than 4,000 miles long, and that broken at Lake Baikal. Almost as difficult also was it to reinforce the Fleet in Eastern waters, and the Japanese might well hope to cripple the Pacific Squadron before ever the reinforcements arrived.

The Japanese were more fortunately placed. Their superiority of naval force in Far-Eastern waters would enable them to secure the passage of transports to the mainland, and it was reasonably calculated that in six weeks from the outbreak of war, a force sufficient to cope with the Russians immediately on the spot could be landed in Southern Manchuria, and that this force could be reinforced far quicker than the Russian.

Everything then turned on sea-power; without it Japan could stir neither hand nor foot, and though even were Japan beaten at sea, Russia could not

¹ The Russian Field batteries were 8 gun batteries, but there were two batteries Cossack Horse Artillery of 6 guns.

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land an army in Japan with any hope of doing any good, yet the loss of sea control would mean to Japan her inevitable defeat. Russia, however, was territorially inviolable. Of marching to Moscow there could be no idea. Even Port Arthur was not her own, and Manchuria she was under pledge to evacuate. The Japanese objective then must be the Russian Army, and as this army depended on the railway, certain important stations would become the temporary strategical objects. The capture of Port Arthur and the re-capture of Sakhalin, taken from Japan many years before, and possibly an attack on Vladivostok, would also be strategical points of importance. The naval bases would be peculiarly important, as they would shelter the inferior Pacific Squadron until the arrival of the Russian naval reinforcements.

A glance at the map will show the peninsula of Korea jutting out towards Japan. This peninsula is mountainous, and is about 590 miles long and 150 miles broad. It possesses very many good natural harbours in the south and west. There is hardly a single road in the country worthy of the name, but it is fairly well cultivated, and provides a certain quantity of food and other supplies. A railway completed in January, 1904, connected Fusan and Seoul, and another, 25 miles long, connects Chemulpo with Seoul. The country is bounded on the north-east by the Russian Maritime Province, and on the north and north-west by Manchuria.

Manchuria, wherein the great drama of the war was to be fought out, occupies the north-east portion of the Chinese Empire, and consists of a great plain bordered by great mountain chains. The western chain, the Khingan Mountains, do not effect the story of the war. The great plain which lies between the Khingan Mountains and the mountains in the east is drained by the Sungari, Nonni and Ussuri to the Amur, and thence to the Arctic Ocean, and also by the Liaoho and its tributaries to the Gulf of Pechili. Down this plain runs the great Siberian railway, which from Harbin runs south-east to Vladivostok, and south to Port Arthur *via* Mukden and Liauyang. Both Mukden and Liauyang lie in the plain, though the spurs of the Eastern Mountains run close up to Mukden, and almost right up to Liauyang, south of which town the railway skirts the mountains closely, finally passing into the continuation of the Shan-a-lin range in order to enter the Kuantung Peninsula, which is itself mountainous, and part of the great range.

The climate, though hot in summer and cold in winter, is healthy, and the great plain affords large supplies of food and forage, while the fertile province of Mongolia, bordering Manchuria on the west, also supplies large quantities of food-stuffs, cattle and ponies.

The Russian plan of campaign was based on the assumption that the Japanese would land in Southern Manchuria, and in view of their inferior

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immediate force contemplated a concentration about Mukden and further north. Port Arthur was to be defended to retard the Japanese force, and to shelter the fleet, which would thus be placed in an invaluable strategical situation on the flank of the line of Japanese Sea Communications, and six Army Corps, four Siberian and two European, with two Cavalry Divisions, besides Lines of Communication troops, were to form the Field Army. The Japanese calculated on a naval success sufficiently decisive to enable them to land troops on the mainland with impunity, and their strategical plans show clearly in the working of events.

Strategically, it would seem that delay was everything to the Russians, speed everything to the Japanese.

Of the men on each side much has been written. The Russian peasant is, as a fighting man, well known to every European Army. In centuries of warfare he has shown himself hardy, resolute, and of extraordinary tenacity; neither fatigue nor danger seems to severely shake his morale. On the other hand, he is slow and unintelligent, and shrewd observers had declared that neither the officers nor men of the Russian Army were trained to the pitch that modern soldiers must acquire. The bayonet cult was still worshipped in the Russian Army, and still on active service the soldiers marched and fought with bayonets fixed. The cult of the bayonet had been allowed to

override the careful musketry instruction of the men. The little Japanese soldier, on the other hand, an average of eight inches shorter than his opponent, was a partially unknown quantity. But here, again, shrewd observers had already noted that keenness, intelligence and high training were as marked in the Japanese Service as their absence was marked in that of Russia. General Sir Ian Hamilton noticed this at once, and even prophesied the issue before the event, so impressed was he by the appearance of the Japanese in the following remarkable words:—

“Further, I have fairly let myself in for the opinion that the Japanese Army, battalion for battalion, surpasses any European Army, excepting only the British Army at its best (not at its second-best, which is the state in which it usually finds itself). . . .”

And again:

“The Japanese and Russian Armies denote the overlapping of two stages of civilisation. Apart from its great military forces, the one saving strength of our old Western world lies in its education and intelligence, and yet in this case the representative of the East is the superior in these very factors.

“The one Army is close to its base, the other hangs dependent at the extremity of a single line of railway, thousands of miles long, like a soap-

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bubble at the end of a churchwarden. What reason, then, to fear that my batch of predictions will be falsified? None! It is not so much the idea that we may have put our money on the wrong horse which now troubles me; still less any fear that I may have made a false estimate of the new force which that Army represents. But it should cause European statesmen some anxiety when their people seems to forget that there are millions outside the charmed circle of Western civilisation, who are ready to pluck the sceptre from weaker hands so soon as the old warrior spirit is allowed to degenerate."

The Japanese organisation, too, was known to be perfect, and the transport and medical arrangements most carefully considered.

Both armies were armed with modern rifles, and Russia was in the process of re-arming her artillery with Q.F. long recoil Field Guns. The Japanese had an improved breech-loading weapon converted to Q.F., but not quite up-to-date.

War arrived perhaps somewhat more suddenly than had been expected, for it was not believed that Japan would readily break off negotiations with her great neighbour.

On 5th February the Russian Ambassador received his papers from the Japanese Foreign Office, and on the 8th war actually broke out, a Russian gunboat firing on Japanese torpedo

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boats. On the night of the 8th-9th, and on the 9th February, the Japanese Fleet, under Admiral Togo, inflicted most serious injuries on the Russian Squadron at Port Arthur, and forced them to take refuge under the guns of the fortress; and on the 9th, a Japanese Squadron sank a Russian cruiser which endeavoured to molest the landing of troops at Chemulpo.

At this season the harbours north of Chemulpo were still ice-bound, a fact which must be borne in mind.

The troops landed at Chemulpo consisted of 4 battalions, 12th Division, at peace strength, in all about 2,500 men, and by 3.0 a.m. on the 9th were on shore; two battalions were sent on by rail to Seoul.

At 2.0 p.m. on the 6th February orders to mobilise were issued to the Guard, 2nd and 12th Divisions. On the 14th the 12th Division had completed mobilising, and was brought by rail to Nagasaki, whence it embarked in six echelons. By the 21st the whole division had landed at Chemulpo. Two regiments of the 4th Division were also sent to Seoul and Fusan; Masampo and Gensan were occupied by the Japanese. In order to save marching it was intended to disembark the further troops required to clear Korea further north, as the ice broke up, and meanwhile Pingyang, 150 miles north of Seoul, was seized on the 21st, the party driving off a small Cossack patrol. Lines of

Winter Counters
3 miles Chemulpo/W-80

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communication posts were established, and on the 23rd the Divisional Cavalry 12th Division reached Pingyang. On the 25th the leading Infantry arrived, but it was only by the 18th March that the division was clear of Pingyang, leaving the place free for the other troops. On the 10th and 11th Anju was occupied, and about the 18th the force there was increased to eight squadrons and five battalions and some engineers, consisting partly of 12th Division, and partly of Guards and 2nd Division troops from Chinampo. The Guards and 2nd Division now disembarked at Chinampo, and by the 29th had completed the disembarkation.

The weakness of the enemy enabled Kuroki, who had been appointed to the command of the 1st Army now landed in Korea, to push on his advanced guard beyond Anju, with a view to preparing the road for the further advance on Wiju. The only road available for the further advance was along the coast, the parallel roads being too distant and too bad.

On the 28th there was an engagement at Tiessu between a mixed Guard detachment and six sotnias of Cossacks. The Cossacks were repulsed. By the 31st supplies were arriving by boat from Chinampo at Anju, and so on the 1st April the advance guard moved. This was composed of 5 squadrons, 5 batteries Mountain Artillery, 3 battalions and 1 Company engineers.

Each Division marched in two echelons, with two

days between the 12th Division and Guard Division ; three days between Guard Division and 2nd Division. A flank guard of a squadron, 2 batteries and 3 battalions, marched by Yongpyon on Chiansyong and Siojo on the Yalu.

Meanwhile more sea bases and depots for stores were formed ; eventually five of these, of which the most important was Rikaho, were taken up ; a most valuable example of the importance of sea-power.

In spite of extremely severe weather, which swept away the bridges, the advanced guard occupied Wiju on the 8th April, and by the 21st April the whole Army was concentrated at Wiju.

No opposition could be offered by the Russians, but on their side there had been no idleness, and grass was not allowed to grow on the Siberian railway.

Mobilisation was slow on account of the immense distances, but it was pushed on fairly satisfactorily. With the greatest energy, between the 10th and 29th February, a line was laid over the ice on Lake Baikal and 2,000 waggons sent over to minimise the shortage of rolling stock in the far sections, while all along the line more sidings were constructed, so that nine trains a day could be run each way.

In spite of difficulties a line was completed round Lake Baikal, under the personal supervision of Prince Chikoff, Minister for Communications, by the 25th September ; meanwhile troops marched

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round, after the ice gave, and supplies were shipped across.

The performances of this railway during the war were most remarkable. According to Löffler, up to the end of 1904, 410,000 men, 93,000 horses, and about 1,000 guns with transport, trains, ammunition, clothing, etc., besides about 100,000 non-combatant service men and women, were forwarded over the 4,500 miles from European Russia to Mukden.

The Russian forces were originally split into two groups: in South Ussuri, I. Siberian Army Corps, and in Southern Manchuria, headquarters Mukden, II. and III. Siberian Army Corps.

Besides these were the permanent garrisons of the Naval Stations, the railway troops, and the garrison of the Island of Sakhalin.

Admiral Alexieff, the Viceroy, was also Commander-in-Chief, and General Linievitch, a fine old soldier, veteran of every war since the Crimea, commanded the troops in Manchuria.

As has been pointed out, the Russian strategy had to be based on the fact that several months were required for mobilisation—that is to say, that decisive fighting *must* be avoided, and time *must* be gained.

The Russian advanced troops from the Manchurian Army were on the Yalu, and at first consisted of a Brigade of Cossacks under Mischenko, and a Division of Infantry (not

up to strength) under Kastalinski. The Russians, it may be observed parenthetically, have been much blamed by certain Continental strategists for not having had more troops ready for eventualities in Manchuria. Seeing, however, that the Russians were under pledge to evacuate Manchuria, to have sent more than two Army Corps, over and above the railway guards, into Southern Manchuria, would be stretching a point further than even Muscovite diplomacy could respectably go.

On the 27th March Kuropatkin arrived from Russia to take over military command in the Far East, subject, in general, to the direction of the Viceroy. He found that the component parts of his Army had been much dispersed. Large numbers of the original Siberian I. Army Corps, which had been quartered in Southern Ussuri had been sent to reinforce Port Arthur, and with them a portion of the III. Corps. More troops had been sent to the Yalu, and the assembling of his Army thereby made more difficult.

There seems to be no doubt that it was Alexieff who was responsible for this state of affairs; it was he who increased the force on the Yalu, detached hundreds of miles from its base (the railway from Harbin to Port Arthur), and he who assisted in making confusion worse confounded by sending odd units here and odd units there, until the assembling of the force in groups, having proper cohesion, appeared an almost impossible task.

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Further, it was Alexieff who insisted in shutting up a large force of Field troops inside Port Arthur.

The garrison of Port Arthur appears to have been brought up finally to 45,000 men, including Volunteers, and immense quantities of supplies of all kinds were forwarded to the fortress, which was placed under command of General Stoessel.

Information as to the movements of troops leaked out, too, into the Far Eastern papers; thus, 25th February, one Siberian Artillery Brigade from the 1st Siberian Army Corps was noted as having moved from Nikolsk to Liauyang, and so forth, information which must have helped the Japanese intelligence department.

At the time Kuroki had concentrated at Wiju, two and a half months after the outbreak of war, Kuropatkin had headquarters at Liauyang and troops:

1. In and around Liauyang and Makau—
 - 1st, 5th and 9th East Siberian Rifle Divisions.
 - 1st Siberian Infantry Division.
 - Trans-Baikal Cossack Division (Rennenkamp).
 - 2 Regiments of Cossacks.
 - Engineers and Details.
2. In the Yalu under Zasulich—
 - 3rd and 6th East Siberian Rifle Divisions.
 - Siberian Cossack Division (Mischenko).

3. Port Arthur under Stoessel :
4th and 7th East Siberian Rifle Division.
5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.
4. Vladivostok—
Part 2nd and 8th East Siberian Rifle
Division.
Ussuri Cossack Brigade.

In all some 134,000 Field Troops. Of these the force on the Yalu amounted to 23,000, and were distributed by General Zasulich in part along the Yalu to watch the passage and prepare to dispute it. The lines of communication of this force ran back by Fenghuangchang, and also by Saimachi on Liauyang, but the former was the more important. The force also watched the coast as far as Takushan and even to Pitzevo, an extreme front of 170 miles for which, excluding lines of communication troops, no more than 19,000 men and 62 guns were available.

Kuroki had concentrated three Divisions and a brigade of Howitzers consisting of a total combatant strength on the day of the Battle of the Yalu of

- 9 Squadrons.
- 36 Battalions.
- 128 Guns.
- 9 Companies' Engineers.


In all 40,866 men and 128 guns, and on the 21st his three Divisions lay about Wiju, with a flank guard at Chyangsyong.

The position taken up by Zasulich extended

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from Chiulengcheng as the centre to the right (west) to about four miles beyond Antung, and eastwards to the Ai River.

In front of the centre the valley of the Yalu is three to four miles wide, and consists of a sandy plain broken up into many islands by the maze-like branches of the Yalu and its tributary the Aiho. The ground in the valley is open, and there is no



cover except behind the patches of scrub in Kinteito and Osekito, or under the banks of the several channels of the river. The position covered a front of nearly twenty miles. A feature of the line, which formed the key to the Chiulengcheng position is the isolated feature, in reality a spur of the higher mountains behind, called Tiger Hill, which lies at the confluence of the Ai and Yalu Rivers. General

Zasulich's instructions were to watch and delay the enemy ; and in one of Kuropatkin's despatches he is reminded that he is posted on the Yalu "not for a decisive action with the enemy in superior numbers." These instructions were reiterated as late as the 25th. To defend his position Zasulich placed one and a half Divisions under Kastalinski in the Chiulengcheng position, and the bulk of the Cavalry with I. Brigade Infantry under Mischenko at Antung. Thus Zasulich's force of about 23,000 men was broken into two portions.

The Japanese had very exact information of the enemy's strength, and General Kuroki decided to amuse the Russian right, and attack the Chiulengcheng portion of the position.

From Chiulengcheng northwards, spursterminating in knolls from 150 to 200 feet high, ran out towards the river.

At the foot of these spurs Infantry entrenchments, very badly concealed, were dug, and apartments for 12 guns were prepared on the high ground west of Chiulengcheng ; these also were easily visible. Lateral communications did not exist, and there were a road and a track, which latter was not used, leading back to Fenghuangcheng.

The position afforded a fine field of fire, and the rivers presented formidable obstacles, for the Yalu was unfordable, and the Ai 4 to 5 feet deep. The Yalu ran here in two channels, the northern 230 yards broad, the southern 380.

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Every possible artifice that ingenuity and skill could devise was employed by the Japanese to conceal their intentions from the Russians, and constant demonstrations by gunboats were made about Antung.

By the 25th material for the bridges had been collected, and on the night 25th-26th, a battalion of the Guard occupied Kyurito, and the 2nd Division seized Kinteito. Thereupon the Russians withdrew from Tiger Hill.

On the 26th and 27th a bridge was thrown to Kinteito: this bridge was intended partly as a blind. On the night 27th-28th another and shorter bridge was made to the same place, and between the 26th and 28th four other bridges were completed.

Orders for the final movement were issued at 10.0 a.m. on the 28th, and were briefly as follows:—

1. The 12th Division to cross at Suikauchin (where the stream on the northern channel is shallow), on the night of the 29th-30th, and occupy the ridges of which Tiger Hill is a spur, thus covering the passage of the main force. This Division to move forward on the 1st May, and to occupy a line covering the passage of the rest of the Army.

2. 2nd Division to be in line on Chukodai Island by dawn on the 1st.

3. Guard to cross by same bridges as 2nd Division, and occupy a line between the 2nd and 12th.

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4. The Howitzers, and one battalion as escort, to dig themselves in on Kinteito during the night of the 29th-30th.

5. Reserve, 5 squadrons, 4 battalions, to assemble at Kyurito by 4.0 a.m., 1st May.

On the 29th, under cover of 3 batteries and some infantry, who drove off the Russian patrols and sentries, the 12th Division commenced the bridge at Suikauchin.

Now was the time for the Russians to retire. Quite outnumbered, and far from their base, a retreat was no disgrace, a defeat would be disastrous, and a victory of little practical value, for it could not be decisive. Zasulich, however, decided to stay and fight it out.

Zasulich, on receiving news of the Japanese advance, ordered reinforcements of a battalion and a half-battery to proceed to Suikauchin, and took measures to cover the Saimachi road.

On the evening of the 29th the Russians re-occupied Tiger Hill. Thus the further bridging arrangements at this point were interrupted on the night 29th-30th. However, the Howitzers and the Artillery of the 2nd Division successfully entrenched themselves on Kinteito, every precaution being taken to conceal their position.

On the morning of the 31st the Guard Artillery compelled the Russians on Tiger Hill to retire, and a battery entrenched on the high ground north-east of Chiulengcheng having opened fire on some

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boats in the river, the mass of guns on Kinteito attacked them, and silenced them within half an hour.

Meanwhile the 12th Division, having completed the bridge at 3.0 a.m., had crossed, and was advancing in 3 columns. The right column (a battalion and a squadron) having orders to work wide of the Russian left.

The advance was reported to Zasulich, who ordered the left to hold on. By noon the 12th Division had cleared Tiger Hill, when it was at once occupied by the Guard and the construction of a road for the guns and three more bridges commenced. During the night three batteries (2nd Division) were put over in pontoon fashion from Kinteito to the right bank, and entrenched themselves.

The movements detailed in orders now took place, and by daylight, 1st May, the 2nd Division were already entrenched within 2,000 yards of the Russian trenches, with the three batteries referred to above on their left. The Guards were in line, and entrenching, and the 12th Division stood on the right of the Guards.

General Zasulich had failed to understand the warnings, of the Japanese movements, of his own Commander-in-Chief Kuropatkin, or of the reports of his left section commander Kastalinski, and had ordered Kastalinski to hold his ground at Chiulengcheng with 7 battalions and 16 guns, and that, too, though on the 29th - 30th. The two

batteries were overwhelmed by the Japanese Artillery in a few moments, and the Infantry had been seriously shaken.

When morning broke on the 1st May a thick fog hung over the valley, but at 6.0 a.m. it lifted, and the Japanese guns opened fire.

About 7.0 Kuroki gave the orders for a general attack, and under cover of the Artillery the Japanese Infantry dashed into the Aiho.

The losses checked the left of the 2nd Division for a little, but the right pushed on and forced the Russians in their front to vacate their trenches.

A counter attack by a company with the bayonet failed.

The left now began to push on again, and about 8.30 Kastalinski ordered his right to withdraw to a previously selected position in rear; about the same time the advance of the Guard forced the Russian left to withdraw.

Meanwhile the 12th Division had been slowly pushing forward over very difficult country, but the bulk of the Russians made good their retreat in face of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in good order, only a portion of the left section and a battery being lost.

Kastalinski now put his troops, about 5 battalions and a battery, in position on the right bank of the Hantuhotze stream. The remainder of the Russians near Antung, still remained inactive.

It was 9.0 a.m. when the Japanese reached the first

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Russian positions, and now there was an unaccountable halt, probably to allow the guns to close up, though, as only one beaten battery was with the Russians, this seems a poor reason. About 10.0 a.m. Zasulich, having examined Kastalinski's dispositions, ordered a general retirement.

Kastalinski was to form the rear-guard, and 2 battalions and a battery from the general reserve were sent to him as reinforcements. To avoid sending them through the gorge, south-east of Hamatan, Kastalinski placed the Infantry on the height eastwards of that place.

North-east of that place, about 11.0 a.m., Gromoff, commanding the left section, was in action, reinforced by a battalion and a section of Artillery, with a battalion and a battery at Chinggon, but was able to delay the advance of the Japanese. Further Japanese appearing, Gromoff prepared to retire, and about 1.0 p.m. received orders to do so by Lushigou, which he successfully did.

Meanwhile Kuroki had, about 11.30, ordered the 2nd Division to move on Antung, while the Guard Cavalry, supported by 4 battalions, advanced on the Fenghuangcheng road, *via* Hamatan. These columns, however, made no progress, and the 12th Division were still only able to crawl along owing to the nature of the terrain.

About 1.30 p.m., Kastalinski commenced his withdrawal, but the retirement of Gromoff, and the pressure of the Japanese, had endangered the

Russian left, while one Japanese company, 5th of the 24th Regiment, had succeeded in putting itself on the hills that overhang the defile through which the road passes.

The Russian rear-guard defended itself from the foe, now crowding on them from all sides, with the utmost gallantry, but the 5th-24th stood firm, and at 3.0 p.m. Watanabe arrived and took command, and gradually drove the Russians off the hills they had occupied into the defile. At 4.40 the gallant 5th-24th was reinforced just as it was on the point of sustaining, after a loss of 66 per cent., the bayonet charge of 300 Russians, and at 5.10 p.m. Watanabe ordered the Guards to close with the bayonet, whereupon the gallant Russians surrendered after a most heroic resistance, which gave the main body and transport the time necessary to make good their escape. The Russians lost some 2,400, of which 600 were prisoners, many of whom were wounded, 21 guns and 8 machine guns; the Japanese, 38 officers and 983 men—total, 1,021.

Thus the first pitched battle of the war had been fought and won, and the influence on the Japanese morale must have been incalculable.

There can be no doubt that the success was partly due to the caution which characterised the Japanese movements, and left nothing to chance. At the same time Kuroki, with 45,000 men, was held inactive for several days (20th to 31st) by a force less than half his strength, so it would appear

24 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ON LAND

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
that caution was extreme. Löffler's criticism on the tactics of the Russians is undoubtedly sound. "That it was right to hold the line of the Yalu is undoubtedly true, for time was everything, and the river a most formidable obstacle. It was tactically not strategically that the Russians were at fault, for they might have used the river as Napoleon did the Rhine after the Battle of Leipsic for a feint defence; and after the position was turned, they should have retired, and not risked an engagement with superior forces.

"Lastly, if he intended to fight at Chiulengcheng, Zasulich should have held his reserve at hand, and not at Antung."

Meunier compares the position on the Yalu on the 30th April, 1904, to that on the Sarre on the 6th August, 1870, and while Sir Ian Hamilton compares Zasulich's tactics with those of Lee at the Battle of Fredericksburg. The influence of the gunboats near Antung, in holding Zasulich's right and reserve fast, is interesting as an example of naval action in conjunction with troops.

Zasulich captured by gunboats, was driven from Kiosupatten & retreated to Chiulengcheng by interference on the part of the former, held his troops too long in their positions

This is a detailed map of the Japanese Empire and surrounding regions. The map shows the Japanese archipelago, including the main islands of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu, as well as the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria. Major cities and locations are labeled, including Harbin, Mukden, Seoul, and Tokyo. The map also shows the Sea of Japan and the surrounding waters. The map is oriented with North at the top.



CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS UP TO MID-JUNE, INCLUDING THE BATTLES OF NANSHAN AND WAFANGU — GENERAL REMARKS ON OPERATIONS

ON the 16th April a naval engagement had practically placed the Russian Pacific fleet *hors de combat*, and numerous attempts were made by the Japanese to seal Port Arthur harbour by sinking ships in the fair way. An attempt on 3rd May was reported as successful, but it since appears that this was only partially the case. The four cruisers of the Vladivostok group were at large, and endeavoured to molest the Japanese transport arrangements, but though they met with a little success were finally quieted.

The 2nd Japanese Army, under Oku, had been awaiting in their transports the result of the Battle of the Yalu. This army consisted of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Divisions, some Reserve (Kobi) Brigades, 1st Brigade Cavalry, 1st Brigade Artillery, to which was attached a regiment of 25 4·7-inch Howitzers, a light siege train of 50 guns, with engineers and details, or a total combatant strength of 75,000 men. The point selected for disembarkation was on the

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Kuantung Peninsula, opposite Elliott Island, and not far from Pitzevo. The disembarkation commenced on the 5th of May, and was completed by the 20th. Oku had pushed out advanced troops at once on landing, and cut the railway on the 6th, while a few days later the railway was more effectually destroyed, and Port Arthur was at last blockaded.

The first Japanese object, the occupation of Korea, had been accomplished. The second was the capture of Port Arthur. It was, it is true, possible to mask it, and march with all available field forces on the main Russian Army, but the capture presented other valuable advantages, for it would deal a terrible blow against Russian prestige, and carried with it the destruction of the Russian Far Eastern Squadron, which, so long as it existed, was a standing menace to the safety of the Japanese communications, and would, with the arrival of the European Squadron, make a formidable fleet to challenge again the mastery of the sea with the Japanese.

The Russians had used the three months' grace to good purpose, and had assembled at Port Arthur a total of about 45,000 men, including several thousand volunteers, the 4th and 7th East Siberian Rifle Division complete and the 5th Regiment East Siberian Rifles, a formidable body of field troops. The fortress was provided with food and ammunition and all the appliances modern science has placed at the disposal of a force in a besieged town.

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On the 16th May Oku, advancing southwards, was in close touch with the troops of the mobile column from the fortress, who had taken up a position at Nanshan in the isthmus between the Liaotung and Kuantung peninsulas. An advance guard action took place on the 16th, the Russians falling back on the main body.

The position lay from shore to shore along a line of low hills of from 250 to 350 feet in height, and was strongly entrenched. The ground to the front had been cleared of cover, barbed wire entanglements constructed, as well as abattis and mines and two searchlights, while numerous redoubts, mounting heavy siege guns, were connected by deep trenches, the whole position being about 4,500 yards long, increased according to the tide by 1,500 to 2,000 yards of fore-shore on each flank. The eastern flank was further supported by a Russian gunboat, the *Bobr*.

This position was held by the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division and the 5th Regiment 2nd East Siberian Rifle Division, in all 15 battalions and 60 field guns, with 30 heavy siege guns, mostly old Chinese weapons.

On the 25th May Oku concentrated 3 divisions and the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, in all 36 battalions and 216 guns, a total of about 55,000 men.

During the night 25th-26th, the 4th Division attempted an attack which failed. About 4.30

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a.m., on the 26th, covered by the artillery, the 3 divisions advanced for the attack, the 4th on the right or west side, the 1st in the centre, and the 3rd on the left. The right attack was aided by 4 Japanese gunboats in Kinchou Bay, but at 11.0 a.m., owing to the tide, 2 of these boats had to withdraw.

On the right the 4th Division seized Kinchou and occupied the village of Liukiaten. In the centre the 1st Division failed to pass the mines and entanglements in spite of the most desperate attempts, while on the left the 3rd Division was equally unsuccessful. Throughout the day, the line time and again advanced and was swept back again until it seemed as if victory must rest with the Russians; however, as the sun was setting, Oku called upon his men once more, and with the aid of the gunboats the Russian left was partly turned by the 4th Division, and about 7.30 p.m. Stoessel gave the order to retreat, which was accomplished without loss, though 78 siege and field guns were abandoned.

The Japanese loss was 151 officers and 4,173 men, while the Russian was only about 850 all told.

The battle is remarkable for the staunch fighting of both sides, and was a successful frontal and flank attack combined. The failure of the Russians to prepare for and execute a counter attack undoubtedly contributed to their final discomfiture.

The Russians, with some show of reason, claimed the engagement as a victory, for they withdrew in face of a stronger force without loss or pursuit, and the guns abandoned were of small value.

General Stoessel has been blamed for not having a larger force at Nanshan; the 7th East Siberian Rifle division was not employed. The Russian strategy consisted so largely of stringing out their forces in detachments along the lines of communication, and resisting with these detachments for a period as long as possible and then withdrawing, that at first sight this action appears to have been a case in point. Stoessel, however, was the commander of a fortress, and therefore the cases are not similar. A successful defence of the isthmus could only be temporary, for the Japanese, having command of the sea, could land where they pleased outside the range of the guns of the fortress. Stoessel's tactical error was his failure to keep in hand a reserve, which might at the crucial moment have acted against the turning movement of the 4th Division, and stemmed the tide of success; the repulse of the Japanese frontal attack would then have been assured.

The ground on the Russian left was much cut up with deep ravines, which, with the falling tide, assisted the Japanese 4th Division in their attack, the one affording much dead ground, the other an open manœuvring area. Some of the troops actually waded through the sea waist-deep.

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Of the Japanese tactics Meunier writes: "The attack was not perhaps conducted according to the rules of tactics. The 'special preparation' by the artillery proved its entire insufficiency. The infantry formations still showed some inexperience. But Oku's action in sending forward his divisions to one last supreme effort, at the moment when ammunition was running out, places him in the class of the Davaouts and the Alvenslebens. The leader of the 2nd Army is a true warrior, and he showed it again at Sandepu and Mukden."

While these operations were in progress, the 3rd Army (Nogi) had commenced disembarking near Pitzevo, and the 4th Army (Nodzu) at Takushan.

On the 30th his advance guard having entered Dalny, Oku, turned over the 1st Division to Nogi, who had been detailed to the siege of Port Arthur. Oku, with the 3rd and 4th Divisions, some reserve Brigades, and the Brigades of Cavalry and Artillery, turned north, and by the 12th June had passed Port Adams on his march northwards.

Nogi had commenced disembarking at Pitzevo, but he now transferred his base to Dalny, where we will for the present leave him preparing for the siege of Port Arthur.

Oku was now reinforced by the 5th and the 6th Divisions, and on the night of the 13th June the 3rd and 5th Divisions were not far south of

Wafangtien, the 4th Division about 12 miles further west on the Fuchou road.

On the 14th the Japanese were in touch with the advanced guard of Stakelberg's troops, and during the afternoon a heavy artillery engagement took place and the Japanese pushed close up to the left of the ground on which the Russians had taken up a position.

Since the news of the investment of Port Arthur became known, the Viceroy and the St. Petersburg authorities had been pressing Kuropatkin to advance in force to its relief. The political importance of Port Arthur was so great that the civilian authorities were blinded to the hopelessness of the undertaking from a military point of view. There seems to be not a shadow of doubt that Kuropatkin was as much against this forward move as any soldier in his senses would have been, and that the blame for the gross strategical blunder now committed by the the Russians must not be laid upon him. The original plan of campaign, as we have seen, quite properly contemplated inactivity until the army was mobilised; however, in obedience, to the pressure of the politicians, Kuropatkin sent orders to General Baron Stakelberg to proceed to the south to attempt the relief of Port Arthur, and it was against him Oku had struck.

As a result of those arrangements, General Baron Stakelberg left Haijcheng on the 28th May,


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1. *...*

During the fighting on the 14th the Japanese

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unaware of the retrograde movement, and was severely handled during the withdrawal by the dismounted fire action of the Japanese Cavalry Brigade, and by the Artillery. The Japanese Cavalry had previously contributed in no small degree to the repulse of the Russian counter attack.



The Japanese were too exhausted to pursue far, except by shell fire, but a Russian detachment of one battalion that was covering the right rear was caught by the 4th Division and annihilated. The 6th Division was not engaged.

The Japanese loss was 1,653 killed and wounded.

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The Russian loss was apparently about 3,481 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Stakelberg withdrew, covered by Samssonoff's Cavalry, and halted at Senoutcheng on the 18th, where he remained until the 21st, whence he withdrew to Haicheng, and then to Tashikiao.

Criticisms on the action have been numerous, and the failure of the Russian Cavalry to locate the left flank division of the Japanese has in particular come in for a well-merited share of obloquy.

It has been stated, however (and this is the most remarkable part of the story), that the presence of this division *was* actually reported by the Cavalry, but that Stakelberg, or his chief of the staff, had so little confidence in the Cavalry officer who made the report that they refused to give it credence, or indeed take any action to verify it. The Russian Cavalry was greatly stronger than the Japanese, yet we find that the Japanese Cavalry Brigade was able to inflict much damage on the main body as it retired.

The Japanese gunners never gave the Russian Artillery a chance, but they outnumbered them by two to one, and besides, the Russian gunners had only just received their new Q.F. guns, and shot very badly with them. The Russian counter attack on the Japanese right is stated to have taken the following remarkable formation. It was delivered by a brigade under General Gerngros supported by twelve guns :—

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Eight companies formed the firing line.

Four battalions the second line.

Three battalions the third line.

Extended over a front of less than 1,500 yards.

What wonder, says Löffler, that a formation allowing only about one-third of the men to use their rifles was found unsuitable to attack against men armed with magazine rifles?

Löffler's criticism of the position taken up by Stakelberg is, that it was divided in half by the Fuchou River running in a valley one and a half miles wide with steep sides, and therefore that timely mutual assistance by either wing was difficult.

The only hope of success lay in concentrating as far as possible on one bank, preferably the left, and endeavouring to force the enemy off his line of communication with Port Adams.

Stakelberg, as we have seen, retired rapidly from Wafangou, covered by Samssonoff's Cossacks, to Wantselin, and thence by Senoutchen, to Kaiping. To assist Stakelberg, Kuropatkin ordered the Russian left under Keller to advance and take the offensive against the Japanese right and centre.

After the battle of the Yalu, Kuroki gave his troops a day or two of rest, and then advanced on Fenghuangcheng on the 4th May. Count Keller had replaced Zasulich in command of the troops on the Russian left, and retired from Fenghuangcheng, which was occupied by the Japanese on 6th May;

by the 11th the 1st Army was concentrated there, and remained halted there until the middle of June, thus threatening the flank of any movement against Oku, with the result, as we have seen, that only an inconsiderable force could be detached under Stakelberg for an enterprise against that general; and also covering the disembarkation of the 4th Army under Nodzu at Takushan. To further assist Nodzu, Kuroki was ordered to lend him the reserve (Kobi) Brigade of the Guard. Strong reconnaissances kept the Russians occupied, and formidable works constructed in front of Fenghuangcheng allowed the work of construction of a tramway from Antung to Fenghuangcheng to be proceeded with in safety.

Thus in the middle of June the positions of the armies were, as is shown in the map to illustrate the advance on Liauyang. Kuroki was about Fenghuangcheng, Nodzu about Hsiayenchon, Oku having beaten Stakelberg, was about Wafangou, the bases being respectively Antung, Takushan, Talienwan. Nogi was based on Dalny operating against Port Arthur.

Before going further it may be as well to examine some of the criticisms on the operations of both sides up to this time.

The situation at the outbreak of hostilities showed that though Russia, through her enormous size and vast population, is stronger than Japan, yet at the point of contact between the two forces

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—that is to say, in Korea and Southern Manchuria, and the waters of the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan —Japan had a superiority of strength immediately available. On the other hand, should Japan not be able to establish, not merely a superiority, but a considerable superiority, at sea, it would be a matter of great difficulty for her to land and maintain an army in Southern Manchuria of force able to cope with that which Russia could place in the field within a few months of the outbreak of war. It is, however, evident that Russia must at first stand on the defensive, and it was to meet this necessity that her original Plan of Campaign was drawn up.

This plan, it is now well known, was:—

1. To mobilise the existing three Army Corps, Railway Troops and Garrisons in the Far East by calling in their Reservists.
2. To increase this force to six Army Corps and two Divisions of Cavalry as a Field Army beyond Railway Guards and Garrisons.

It was recognised that this operation might take six months, and it was calculated that the advance of the Japanese from some port in Southern Manchuria must be slow. But it was believed that the landing could only take place six weeks after the outbreak of war, on account of the necessity to establish a naval superiority, and that in any case, the navy in the Far East, sheltered by Port Arthur on the flank of the Line of Com-

munication to Japan, could seriously impede the conveyance of troops, reinforcements and supplies.

It was confidently expected that the landing would take place in Southern Manchuria. Now the actual course that events took was briefly as follows :—

Within two days of the outbreak of war, the Russian Fleet, except four cruisers and a few torpedo-boats, was blockaded in its own port, and the Japanese were free to land where they would.

They had already elected to land an army in Korea, and did so at Chemulpo, slowly advancing on the Yalu whither the Russian advance posts had been pushed forward. It was not until nearly three months after the outbreak of war that the Japanese entered Southern Manchuria, and invested Port Arthur.

Löffler criticises the strategy of the Japanese thus :—

“As soon as the first naval engagement was known, it became evident that troops to the number of at least two Divisions could have been landed at Pitzevo or Port Adams, and at that time a Division would have sufficed to mask Port Arthur, while the railway would have formed an available line for supplies, and the remaining Division would have advanced along it to unmask Niuchwang and Takushan, either of which could have been used as a port of disembarkation. A large army could then have been landed, which would have forced

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the Yalu troops to withdraw to avoid being cut off, and Korea would thus have fallen a prize to Japan without striking a blow, and could have been occupied by a reserve Division."

He then quotes the following sentence from Clausevitz (vom Kriege, Book VI., Chapter I.):

"What is the purpose of Defence? To hold! To hold is easier than to acquire, and it follows that with equal means, to defend is easier than to attack. But wherein lies the greater ease of holding or defending? In this, that very moment of time which is unemployed, is of advantage to the Defender. He reaps where he has not sown. Every oversight, every moment wasted by the attacker, through fear or mistake, is so much given to the Defender.

"There is no doubt that the Russians had extraordinary luck in this matter. Further, Port Arthur could have been invested in the beginning of March, and much loss of life saved to the Japanese, while as a much smaller number of troops would be required for the siege, more would be available for the Field Army.

"Time was everything, and we must utterly condemn the politics that sacrificed military necessities to the political advantages of the immediate occupation of Korea. If ice prevented a landing in the Liautung Peninsula in February, then diplomacy should have averted the war until the right moment. The Japanese had every advantage

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(of course after the initial naval success, but they evidently counted on this), and failed to utilise them."

Such is an outline of this well-known German military writer's views on the Japanese strategy, and the general trend of German criticisms supports this view. French criticism is on the whole more lenient. The occupation of Korea was a vital necessity to the Japanese, and the question whether or not it was essential to completely occupy it before attempting to blockade Port Arthur, their next objective, is arguable. Still to march a force of 45,000 men through so difficult a country, seems a peculiar operation to undertake for a power possessed of complete control of the sea.

Assuming that Japanese diplomacy could not put off the war until the harbours were ice-free, then surely a Division and a Cavalry Brigade would have been enough to occupy Seoul, and push on northwards to gain touch with the Russians. The Japanese must have been aware of the strength of the Russian forces in Manchuria and east of Lake Baikal; they must have realised the time that mobilisation would require, and they must have seen that it was a hopeless impossibility, or, at least, the most absurd strategy for the Russians to detach a considerable force to advance into Korea.

At any time the harbours might be ice-free, and what would have been the position of Zasluch's force if, instead of waiting on the Yalu, he had

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advanced into Korea, and then found that a Japanese force had landed at Antung or Takushan? The only explanation is that the Japanese were so determined to leave nothing to chance, that they were over-cautious.

This is also sufficient to account for the delay in landing Oku's Army until after the battle of the Yalu, wasting precious days, when Port Arthur was becoming strong enough to hold larger and larger forces of the Japanese fast, which might otherwise have been available with the Field Army.

The Japanese seem also to have over-estimated the Russian forces in Manchuria and South Ussuri, to judge from a conversation with an important Japanese military official, recounted by General Sir Ian Hamilton. The actual numbers available as field troops at the commencement of operations were only about 80,000, the remaining troops in the Far East being required for railway guards and garrisons.

There were reserves east of Lake Baikal available to bring the troops up to 105,000 men, but the distances were so great that even these reserves would hardly join the colours much under two months.

The more one considers the matter, the more clear it is that Japanese strategy during the first three months of the war was cautious to an excess bordering on the dangerous. The ports of the Liautung Peninsula were ice-free at the end of March, as was Takushan; why, then, did the

Japanese General Staff delay the disembarkation of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armies till May?

However, as Major Löffler admits, it is easy to be wise after the events

With regard to organisation, it must be admitted that the Japanese showed wonderful skill in the management of the disembarkation and supply of their troops, as the following description, quoted by Sir Ian Hamilton, shows :—

“Each transport, in addition to her ordinary equipment of boats, carried several large flat-bottomed sampans, such as are used in Japan for coasting purposes. These sampans, closely packed, carried about 50 men, or a corresponding amount of horses or war material. When filled they were rapidly towed by a fleet of steam launches, up to four landing stages about 150 yards long, to which they were attached by the skilful manœuvres of two trained boatmen, who lived in the covered stern of each sampan. The piers connecting each stage with the land consisted of a wooden plank gangway, about 100 yards in length, supported on sampans which rested on the mud at low water and floated when the tide came in. Under the excellent arrangements in force, about 20 transports were able to land men and material simultaneously. Each vessel carried a number of little two-wheeled carts, which were put together at once on landing, loaded up with sacks of rice, and wheeled off by three or four men to the depots. By this means nothing

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was allowed to accumulate on or near the piers. In fact, the most noticeable point of all about this disembarkation was the energy with which any troops, horses or stores were moved on the moment they set foot on land so as not to block the gangways or exits even for a moment."

Long though the march through Korea took, there is no doubt that, as an achievement of military organisation, it was a splendidly managed affair. The Japanese transport and supply arrangements were wonderfully worked, and not even the barren character of the country, nor, the lack of a road that could be called better than a mere track, prevented the punctual arrival of troops and supplies at their destinations.

That more might have been done in road-making, the following quotation from Sir Ian Hamilton shows:—

"I do not speak without knowledge when I say that the Japanese would save the lives of men and horses, and get 10 per cent. more stuff to the front in a given time, if they would devote more attention to their roads. Not far from where I am writing there are short sections of the highway which in rain turn into sloughs of mud, peppered at intervals with large boulders. It is just possible to struggle and scramble through this when it is wet, with much cracking of whips, and when it is dry and the river low, the carts can escape the bad bit by walking along the banks. So repairs are left alone,

and the ample military labour available is now being employed in making a grand avenue up to Kuroki's quarters in a Chinese house."

The transport was chiefly two-wheeled carts, generally moved by hand-power, though occasionally with ponies or mules, and this was supplemented by gangs of Korean and Chinese porters. Anyone who has served in the East or in Africa knows how long a line of carriers is required to provide the wants of even a small column of a few score of men, and can form some idea of the immense difficulty of transporting food in this fashion for large bodies of troops, and for the carriers and ricksha porters themselves. The Russians, on the other hand, were able to draw on the fertile districts of Manchuria for their supplies, at any rate in part.

When, however, praising the Japanese transport arrangements, it should not be forgotten that in one point they were most defective and that was their transport cart. The carts proved as bad as bad could be, and broke down entirely, being replaced by Chinese carts. The Japanese had been preparing for years for war in Manchuria and Korea, and should have known whether their cart was suitable or not. It is not difficult to picture the storm of indignation against military incompetence that would be raised in the half-penny press, or penny press either, for the matter of that, in England were such a contretemps to happen to a British expedition, prepared for

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assiduously for years. The difficulty was met by hiring Chinese carts, with drivers and horses complete.

The difficulties to overcome were simply appalling, and easily account for what so many critics have foolishly called the slowness of the Japanese advance. Even the ten days' halt at Wiju was probably due to the necessity to have a reserve of food to hand before undertaking a battle.

After the Yalu was reached Antung was opened as a base for General Kuroki's Army, and a line of tramway, pushed by coolies, was established from thence to Fenghuangcheng. A second line of supply was established by way of the Yalu to Shansong, and thence by cart to Aiyumon, where a depot was established preparatory to the general advance.

There is not much to say about the Russian strategy. It is manifestly clear that Kuropatkin did not mean to fight on the Yalu, and it is now well known that he was against sending Stakelberg south.

The following amusing quotation from Sir Ian Hamilton puts the case in a nutshell:—"If in private life a sober, quiet individual upsets all previous estimates of his character by marrying his cook, it is not necessary to say 'Cherchey la femme!' because she stands there as large as life. When a gross palpable blunder in elementary strategy is made by a general of repute, it should

not be necessary nowadays to seek for the statesman who is usually quite apparent." General Sir Ian Hamilton points out that the detachment at Dundee in 1899 is an exactly parallel case.

Probably the greatest surprise of the war to officers of the great European armies was the failure of the Russian Cavalry. Of these General Negrier writes :—

"How much had Russia's friends hoped of her Cavalry? Why were these hopes falsified? Has her Cavalry proved valueless? Its superiority was, however, indisputable. Superior in numbers in the quality of its horses, in technical instruction, in the tradition of its regiments, it could act with entire freedom. The Cossacks, the perfection of light Cavalry, would, it was thought, surround its enemy as with a flexible chain, and never let a movement pass unnoticed. According to the opinions of all Cavalry doctrinaires (except the English) the Russian Cavalry, armed with carbines and provided with Artillery, would be master of the situation. Its powerlessness has been the cause of utter amazement. The reason of this was twofold, indifferent musketry training; an Artillery powerless against villages. Yet the Russian Cavalry is much in advance of that arm in the other Continental armies. It has long understood that the carbine is the Cavalry weapon *par excellence*, for the chances of attack mounted are very few. Thus all Russian Cavalry are in

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reality Dragoons. But the Cavalry had not carried its beliefs to their legitimate conclusions." It is unnecessary to quote more at this point

The Japanese covered themselves with a screen of small detachments, consisting of the three arms, and this the Cossacks failed to pierce. In the battles of the Yalu, of Nanshan, and Wafangou, there were other points in which the Russian training proved at fault. As has been pointed out by writers innumerable, they filled their trenches with men standing shoulder to shoulder, when a man every two paces would have sufficed; their artillery was badly served, and they made no effort, or but little, to conceal it, and they failed to realise the necessity of an active defence, except at Wafangou, and there the formation of their counter attack was of a pattern foredoomed to failure. In fact they did not realise the value of the modern firearm; they clung to the old-fashioned volley and recourse to the bayonet; they failed to learn the lessons of the Boer War.

At the Yalu and Nanshan the Japanese fought according to the book—that is, the book of the European Army, dense lines pushing forward, regardless of losses, to close range, with a view to a bayonet charge. To push forward to close range is, of course, the object of the attack, but this is not to say that it is to be done in long lines keeping dressing and formation.

Their formations at Wafangou are said to have been

already more flexible. Already they had realised that the men must push forward from cover to cover in flexible lines of skirmishers to establish fire superiority. On either side the men showed themselves to be the best material possible. Both sides displayed perfect coolness under fire, and that courageous tenacity, not only under the stress of danger, but also under fatigue, that is the mark of the good soldier.

It is often lost sight of in England, though never on the Continent, that fortitude under fatigue is a soldierly virtue, at least of equal value to fortitude under the stress of danger. Many soldiers call it the more important virtue of the two.

With these brief remarks, taken from various sources, we will for the present be content, and proceed to the Japanese advance on Liauyang, and the Russian endeavours to arrest it until their force was complete.

It must be remembered that the object of all strategy is to collect a greater force at a given point at the right time than the enemy can do, at the same time preserving the general balance elsewhere in the zone of operations. In this case, it is obvious that, could the Russians gain sufficient time, the greater force would be forthcoming.

CHAPTER III

THE ADVANCE ON LIAUYANG

It may be as well at this point to recapitulate the position about mid-June.

Stakelberg, with his beaten troops, had retired on Kaiping, where he was re-organising the I. Siberian Army Corps. Facing him was Oku about Wafangou with the 2nd Army, 3rd, 4th, 5th Divisions, with some reserve brigades and brigades of cavalry and artillery.

Zarubaieff was about Hsimucheng with the IV. Siberian Army Corps, and Mischenko's brigade of Cossacks facing Nodzu at Hsiuyenchon with the 4th Army, 6th and 10th Divisions, and Kobi Brigade of Guards attached, and Brigade of Cavalry and Artillery.

Keller was about the Motienling and Paliling Passes with three divisions of East Siberian Rifles, and Rennenkampf's cavalry division facing Kuroki at Fenghuangcheng, with 2nd, 12th and Guard Division, and a detachment at Aiyumon.

On the 23rd June the 1st Army (Kuroki) advanced; 12th Division from Aiyumon on

Saimachi; 2nd Division by the main road on the Motienling Pass; Guard in reserve. The weather was bad, but the Russians offered at first but little resistance, and the Motienling was occupied without difficulty; there the 1st Army halted again.

On the 4th of July Count Keller made an attempt to re-capture the Motienling. At 4.0 a.m. on the 4th July a Russian battalion attacked the Japanese outposts in the Pass, and forced back the picquets on to the supports; a picquet at the old Temple took the Russians in the left flank, and two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the regiment, whose 1st Battalion was on outpost duty, led by the Colonel himself, arrived, and drove the Russian Battalion back. A second Russian battalion arrived too late, and by 5.0 a.m. the whole affair was over and the Russians in retreat.

Kuropatkin at this time distributed his left wing differently, leaving Keller with two divisions and a mixed brigade in front of Kuroki's main body. He placed Shlitchevski with a division and a mixed brigade on the Yushuling Pass; Rennenkampf covered the left.

Meanwhile, on the 26th and 27th June Nodzu had occupied the Teling and Fengshuiling Passes, while, after a halt forced on him by the rains on the 6th July, Oku again advanced and occupied the abandoned but strongly entrenched Russian position at Kaiping on the 8th.

On the 17th July Keller renewed his attack on

Right Column	1 Battalion.
Centre Column	14 Battalions.
„	1 Field battery.
„	1 Mountain battery.
Left Column	3 Battalions.

About 12.30 on the night of the 16th-17th the outpost at Chinkouling was attacked, but easily repulsed the Russian attempt; reinforcements hurried up on each side, and the Russians definitely retired towards evening on the 17th.

This attack had been premature, and as the whole Japanese line was connected by telephone, the alarm was soon given. By 4.0 a.m. the Russian Infantry were in possession of the temple outpost position, but failed to get any further. A battalion in close order was caught by the Japanese Artillery and lost 300 men in a few minutes. It was not until midday that the Russian Artillery came in to action, and though their rapid fire had

some effect, the Japanese were by this time masters of the situation, and the Russians withdrew. The regiment sent to Gebato had some small initial success, but were repulsed, and in retreat by midday.

Losses on each side — Russians about 1,200, Japanese 350. The whole affair was most feebly conducted by Count Keller. It was evident by the direction and line of the attack that Keller was fully cognisant of the Japanese dispositions, and he knew the ground. But as Meunier points out, the two flank attacks were far too weak, especially in mountainous country where frontal attack is almost hopeless. The reserve, or rather the rest of Keller's force, consisting of 12 battalions and almost all the Artillery, remained inactive at Tauan. Even so, however, had the Russians followed up their initial success against Okahochi at Gebato, the Japanese right might have been turned, and the whole position rendered untenable. The antiquated methods of manœuvre and fire discipline employed by the Russians are commented upon by Sir Ian Hamilton. The Russian Artillery were almost useless.

Kuroki took immediate advantage of the Russian repulse on the 17th to make his position more secure by ordering the 12th Division to force the Russians opposing him further to the west, thereby bringing their right shoulders up and closing the line. The Russian force, under Herschmann, consisted of 7

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battalions and 5 batteries, with one regiment of Cossacks, and occupied a low line of hills on the west bank of a stream called the Shiho. The action was injudiciously commenced by the Japanese on the evening of the 18th, as they thought they saw signs of an intended retirement. During the night the Japanese Artillery took up positions, and the Russian Artillery occupied theirs at dawn. There was a cannonade lasting from 5.0 a.m. till 9.0 a.m., which had little effect on either side, though the Japanese guns were most skilfully concealed, and made good practise on the Russian Artillery and trenches. General Inouye, however, succeeded in turning the Russian right, and Herschelmann having withdrawn his guns, retired quietly in good order. There was no attempt at pursuit. Losses—Russians 359, Japanese 421. It is noticeable that the Japanese Artillery (it was mountain artillery) did not advance to the close support of the Infantry, even after the Russian guns had withdrawn.

About the middle of July Marshal Oyama arrived in Manchuria and took command of all the Japanese forces on land, with General Kodama as chief of the staff.

It was now the turn of the Japanese left to advance. The Russians had occupied a strongly entrenched position covering the very important railway junction of Tashichiao. The lines were held by the 1st and 4th Siberian Army Corps, and

their outposts gave way before the Japanese advance on the 23rd July. The Russian position was on a low ridge extending from the railway eastwards for some 8 miles. The right was held by the I. Siberian Corps, and the left by the IV. Siberian Corps. In front of the left the ridge ran out into low spurs which were held by an outpost line. Samssonoff's Cavalry covered the right, Mischenko's Cossacks the left. The Russian guns had been entrenched behind cover, and the infantry trenches ran along the lower slopes of the ridge.

The battle of the 24th resolved itself into an artillery duel on the Japanese left, and an attempt by the Japanese right to crush the Russian left.

The action on the left commenced with artillery fire about 5.30 a.m., and eventually the Japanese deployed some 114 guns against the I. Siberian Corps, but so well concealed were the Russian batteries that, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Pachenko commanding the 9th Artillery Brigade, after 15 hours cannonading the total casualties of the I. Siberian Corps was hardly 50 men. On the right, however, the Japanese Infantry, supported by 42 guns, attacked the IV. Siberian Corps. The Russian Artillery here was not so skilfully concealed as on the Russian right, and there were severe losses. Zarubaieff attempted to take the offensive, and Mischenko "consented" to assist. The offensive movement, however, was a

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failure. The Japanese continued to advance slowly, and at dusk attempted to storm the trenches. They were repulsed again and again, but finally acting on Kuropatkin's instructions not to risk defeat, Zarubaieff withdrew; the bulk of the stores at Tashichiao were burnt. Losses—Russian 1,100, Japanese about equal.

The expenditure of ammunition was stupendous. The Russians claimed the engagement as a victory, apparently because it was not a defeat, for there can be no other explanation. The arrangements of the Russian "Oberkommando" in this engagement are most extraordinary. We find Stakelberg suggesting retreat, and Zarubaieff (the Commander-in-Chief) "taking it on himself" to order him to stand fast. We find Mischenko "consenting" to move, and a Major Korsovitch refusing point-blank to carry out an order. The battle was a perfect illustration of the Russian type: "Take up a position; prepare it carefully for," as Meunier puts it, "*a priori* reasons"; hold it if it happened to fit in with the Japanese line of advance; retire before it is too late." Almost every engagement in the war is exactly of a pattern.

The strategical result of the occupation of Tashichiao was most important. On 25th July Inkou was occupied with its invaluable harbour and railway to Tashichiao. Oku and Nodzu then continued the advance, and struck the Russian outposts on the line Haicheng-Hsimucheng on the

30th. The Japanese advance was checked, but the continual pressure of Kuroki on the Russian left induced Kuropatkin to concentrate still further, and the position was abandoned. Haicheng and Nieuchwang were occupied on 3rd August; at the former place large supplies of all kinds fell into the hands of the Japanese.

Returning to the operations of the 1st Army, we find that Kuroki advanced against Keller's positions in the Yangtseling Pass on the 31st July with the Guard and 2nd Divisions, while the 12th Division further to the northwards attacked the Yushuling and Penling passes on the same day.

The action of the Yangtseling Pass is a most interesting one, though a detailed description is beyond the scope of this book.

In brief, the Guard Division was to turn the Russian right (south), while the 2nd Division attacked in front. The country was most difficult, and the enveloping force was divided into 4 small columns, while Kuroki detached Okasaki with 4 battalions, 2nd Division, to assist Inouye with the 12th Division. The left small column did no good, though its total loss was infinitesimal. Meunier remarks that on this day Asada, the commander of this column (3 battalions, $2\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons, 1 battery), and a most hard-fighting general, seems to have had a fit of hesitation like Ney at Bautzen, the 13th German Division at Forbach, the II. Bavarian Corps at Froeschwiller, and asks whether the explanation is

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to be found in psychology or in Napoleon's axiom : "The experience of war shows that a wing must be turned or broken without separating the army." The question is very interesting indeed. In the same way the other 3 columns of the Guard failed to do any good, partly, at any rate, owing to the nature of the terrain, which made lateral communication most difficult, unprovided as the Japanese were with visual signalling apparatus. The 2nd Division, however, were more fortunate, and though every man had to be put into the fight, the position was finally carried after the death of Count Keller had taken the heart out of the Russian resistance.

Meanwhile, though Inouye was checked at Yushuling, at Penling the Japanese had a notable success, resulting in the annihilation of the Russian Brigade in that pass, which was unprovided with artillery.

The Russians at Yushuling withdrew during the night.

Thus, by the 3rd August was the concentration of the whole Japanese Army assured. It lay in an arc of a circle over 30 miles long, with Liauyang as a centre, from near Ponsihu on the Taitseho River to Haicheng on the railway. It looked as if the first great battle was to be fought almost at once, but it was, as a matter of fact, 3 weeks before any move of importance was made. In all probability the reason of this was as much the necessity for the Japanese to reorganise their

lines of communication as the weather, though this latter was so bad that the whole plain round Liauyang was a quagmire. Meanwhile the kiaolang, or millet, was growing and growing, and it has been suggested with much probability that the Japanese were well aware that this would favour their advance, affording as it does almost perfect cover from view.

Both sides utilised the breathing space to reorganise, and by the 21st August the Russians at Liauyang consisted of the following:—

I. Siberian Corps, II. Siberian Corps, III. Siberian Corps, IV. Siberian Corps, X. European Corps, XVII. European Corps, 3 Divisions and 2 Brigades of Cossacks, the Caucasian Cavalry Brigade, 1 regiment of Dragoons. There were also 3 other cavalry regiments, which appear to have been attached as extra Corps Cavalry to one or other of the Army Corps. In addition there were 8 mountain batteries, 2 Howitzer batteries, 3 machine gun batteries, balloon, telegraph and bridging troops.

A Corps consisted of 2 Divisions, with Artillery and one Battalion of Sappers. Each Corps had some cavalry or mounted scouts. A Cavalry Brigade consisted of two regiments and a battery, a Division of 4 regiments and 2 batteries.

An Infantry Division consisted of 2 brigades, of 2 regiments, of 3 or 4 battalions, of 4 companys, nominally 250 strong.

These establishments were, however, only

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nominal, and must only be used to supply a very general guide.

On these establishments an Army Corps should have been from 27,000 to 31,000 strong, but in point of fact none were over 25,000. The total strength, excluding the troops of the I. European Army Corps and V. Siberian Corps, which were just beginning to arrive, is given by Meunier at

172 Battalions (130,000).

147 Squadrons (14,000).

520 Guns.

24 Machine Guns.

Meunier estimates the troops of the I. European and V. Siberian Corps already at Mukden, or on the line to Liauyang, at 30,000 men and 96 guns.

The bulk of the Artillery was now re-armed with the quick-firing gun. The European Army Corps had 14 batteries each—that is, 114 guns, while the Siberian Corps had 64 guns each. The figures are very difficult indeed to obtain accurately. Later on in the war every regiment was brought up to the regulation 4 battalions, and each division provided with 6 batteries of 8 guns each, except some of the Rifle Divisions of the Rifle Corps, which had 4 batteries of 8 guns each; this corps makes its appearance later. At this time many of the Siberian Rifle Divisions were composed of 3 Battalion Regiments, the 4th Battalion having been taken as nucleus troops of new formation.

It is, however, for the purpose of this narrative

sufficient to take it that the Siberian Corps were about 25,000 strong with 64 guns during the battle of Liauyang, and the European Corps 25,000 with 112 guns,

The 6 Army Corps and 14,000 sabres which were at Kuropatkin's disposal at this time, were disposed as follows :—First, there was an advanced line from Anshantien to Anping. Second, the main line of defence divided among 4 Army Corps as follows :—

- | | |
|---|----------------|
| 1. Shoushanpu, I. Siberian Corps. | } South Front. |
| 2. Mindiasan, III. Siberian Corps. | |
| 3. Mindiasan to Siapu, X. Corps. | } East Front. |
| 4. North of the Taitseho. Siapu
to Sikuantun, XVII. Corps. | |

Thirdly, a line of redoubts forming a bridge-head at Liauyang, where 7 bridges had been constructed over the Taitseho. There was cavalry on the flanks. The II. and IV. Siberian Corps were in reserve on the railway, and one Brigade V. Siberian Corps was on the Taitseho as a support to the left wing.

Turning to the Japanese forces, on the 21st August they still occupied much the same position as on the 3rd.

On the Tanho, with a detachment at Ponsihu, was Kuroki. 1st Army :—

Guard Division.

2nd Division.

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12th Division.

Guard Mixed Reserve Brigade.

In the valley of the Sida-ho was Nodzu 4th Army, now consisting of—

5th Division.

10th Division.

1 Brigade Cavalry.

1 Brigade Artillery.

About Haicheng, Oku with—

3rd Division.

4th Division.

6th Division.

1 Brigade Cavalry.

1 Brigade Artillery.

1 or 2 Reserve Brigades.

Each division consisted of 2 Active Brigades, with 7 or 8 batteries. In opposition to the Russians, whose companies were none of them up to war establishment, the Japanese companies were generally quite up to war establishment strength, and the total strength was probably as nearly as possible—


140,000 bayonets.

6,000 sabres.

524 guns.

When it is remembered that, small though the proportion of sick in the Russian Army was, it was far higher than that in the Japanese Army, it will be seen at once that a Japanese division was far

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE ADVANCE ON LIAO-YANG





stronger than a Russian division, and in fact that 3 Japanese divisions were nearly equal to 2 Russian Army Corps, and if a brigade of Field Artillery were operating with the 3 Japanese divisions, the Artillery of the Japanese would far outmatch that of 2 Russian Army Corps. It is a little difficult to find out what exactly were the bases and lines of communication for each army at this time. A light tramway rail had been laid from Antung to Fenghuangcheng, and the 1st Army was apparently served by etappen posts established beyond this, though the 1st Army seems to have received some help from the railway, the bases of the 3rd and 4th Armies were Talieuwan and Inkou. The 2nd Army was based on Dalny.

The effect of the bad weather, particularly on the 29th June to 5th July, and again 14th August to 17th August, had been so bad that the difficulties of transport and supply, both of food and ammunition from Fenghuangcheng to Kuroki, had been extraordinary. At one time the troops were on half rations, and the 12th Division on the right had to withdraw slightly during the first storm towards Saimachi.

The supply of 50,000 troops constantly engaged with the enemy over a mountainous country destitute of roads was a very remarkable bit of work.

*I should have sent one or more divs
from P.A. to Hui-cheng. But there is a matter
of Policy. It was particularly urgent to
take P.A. quickly.*

CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF LIAUYANG

THE town of Liauyang lies in the great Manchurian plain, though the mountainous country comes close up to it on the east. It is traversed by the Taitseho, a deep and unfordable river, running roughly from east to west, and by the railway running roughly from north to south. Its defences, as has been said, consisted of an inner line or bridge-head, a main outer line and advanced line. There were 7 bridges including the railway bridge, 4 in and above the town, 3 below it.

It would appear that though the left flank of the Russian position could be defended from the Mukden direction, from which place troops were being constantly despatched, that the right flank, resting on the railway at Shoushanpu, was in the air. Kuropatkin, therefore, had the bulk of his reserve behind that flank. The distribution of corps to sections, and the division of the whole into two parts, have been explained above, a portion of the left wing being advanced to Ponsihu.

The first business of the Japanese was to force the advanced line.

On the 24th the right wing (Kuroki) moved,

and the 12th Division attacked a Division of the X. Corps east of Anping, and after three days of desperate fighting forced it on to the Tanho. The 2nd Division and Guard meanwhile had driven back the III. Corps, after heavy fighting, from Lantsashan (Liandiasan). The fighting was everywhere of the most desperate character. The Mixed Reserve Brigade moved on Ponsihu. During the 27th, however, Bilderling strengthened the III. Corps and made a counter attack, which failed, though the Japanese were checked. The Japanese, however, succeeded in cutting up the 122nd Regiment on the Russian left. Bilderling now reinforced the X. Corps and intended to execute a vigorous counter attack against the Guard Division next day (28th), but army orders directed his retirement. This retirement was undoubtedly correct, for the X. Corps had been very severely handled, and it was no part of Kuropatkin's plan to fight in front of the Tanho. Fortunately for the Russians the morning of the 28th broke with a dense fog, and it was 4.0 p.m. before it lifted. When it did so the 2nd Division made a tentative effort to advance, but not very energetically, though the Russians were clearly visible filing over the bridge. The Japanese Artillery found the country too bad to get over without a road. The 12th Division continued looking for crossings over the Taitseho in case of need; the Guard Reserve Brigade was engaged near Ponsihu.

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Meanwhile, on the 27th Oku manœuvred the I. Siberian Corps out of its advanced position at Anshanchang (Anshantien) and forced it to retreat to the main position at Shoushanpu. Nodzu supported Kuroki's left (Guards) with the 10th Division, and advanced, forcing the IV. Corps to retire before him towards Zofuntan and Mindiatantse.

The advance continued on the 28th with severe rear-guard fighting. Thus by the 29th the Russians were forced into their main position and the first stage of the operations were over.

On the 29th Kuropatkin issued orders for the defence of the main line. Shoushanpu, Zofantun, Mindiasan, Yatuchi, Siapu, Taitsepu, Sikwantun. The line had been previously divided into four sections, of which the I. Siberian, III. Siberian, X. Army Corps held the three sections from Shoushanpu to Siapu on the Taitseho, while Bilderling with the XVII. Corps held the position north of the Taitseho and guarded the left flank, supported by portions of the V. Siberian Corps, which was beginning to arrive. The Russian left appeared therefore to be strongly guarded. Mischenko's and Greboff's Cossacks covered the right.

The General Reserve, II. Siberian and IV. Siberian Corps, were to assemble about Siudiatun, and Rennenkampf's cavalry at Yantsialintse within the line of forts on the left bank of the Taitseho.

Japanese orders, issued on the 29th for the 30th,

were for an advance of the 2nd and 4th Armies against the Shoushanpu and Zofantun positions, while the 1st Army advanced north-west, Guards on Mindiasan, but no orders were given Kuroki to cross the Taitseho. Its reserve was ordered to be behind its right flank. The reserve brigades of the 2nd and 4th Armies were collected to form a general reserve between Shaho and Sinlintse, that is behind the left of the Japanese.

Evidently the main attack was to be by the 2nd and 4th Armies. The approach march was made by these troops during the night, and early morning of the 30th the battle began with a furious artillery duel. All day the fighting was most desperate, but the Japanese made no effect on the Russian Infantry. Kuroki had pushed the 12th Division north, and the Guards, supported by the 2nd Division, boldly attacked the X. Corps, supported as it was by the III. Corps; so far did they get in that during the 31st the Guards were in a most perilous position. It was not till after the battle of the 30th had begun that Kuroki received orders to push the 12th Division over the Taitseho, while his Reserve Brigade was to cross at Ponsihu.

This momentous decision appears to have been due to a report that the Russians were evacuating Liauyang; a heavily-loaded train was said to be leaving every few minutes for the north, and it was believed that the Russians were endeavouring to avoid a fight to the finish. It does not appear

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that Kuropatkin had really any intention of retirement on the 30th, but the effect of Kuroki's move was extraordinary.

At 11.30 p.m. on the 30th the 12th Division began the passage of the river; they were followed by a brigade of the 2nd, and the Guard Reserve Brigade was ordered to clear the left bank, and then cross to the north bank of the Taitseho.

A bridge at Kangtuantse was only completed by 8 p.m. on the 31st. The left wing of the 4th Army and the 2nd Army renewed the attack on the Russian main position, with the result that more and more of Kuropatkin's reserve was drawn into the fight between Sinlitun and Mayetun.

Oyama's reserve was also thrown into the fight on the right of the 2nd Army.

Kuroki had drawn to him the 2nd Division on the 31st, and furiously assailed Bilderling's positions at Sikwantun. So determined was his bearing that Kuropatkin decided to relieve the I. Siberian Corps from its position at Shoushanpu, which it had so gallantly held, with portions of the II. and IV. Corps, and bring it over the Taitseho to form a reserve to his left. Kuroki was now in a most dangerous position. During the 30th and 31st the Japanese attacks may be said to have totally failed, and Kuropatkin determined to abandon his positions on the south bank of the Taitseho, holding only to the bridge-head, and meanwhile with the XVII., X., III. Siberian, and portion

of the V. Siberian, to crush and utterly annihilate the two divisions, and the Guard Reserve Brigade, which Kuroki had north of the broad Taitseho.

The morning of the 1st September, however, wore away, and as the Russians did not attack, Kuroki himself took the offensive. The fighting, particularly on the hillock Manjuyama north of Sikwantun, was of the most desperate character imaginable. The Russian scheme had been too complex, and Bilderling's only reinforcement on the 1st was Orloff's Brigade, which reached the coal-mines. Meanwhile the fighting in the south was as desperate as ever, and the II. and IV. Corps, who had taken the place of Stakelberg's exhausted I. Corps, fought most gallantly.

On the night of 1st September, from 7 p.m. till midnight, the artillery kept up a fierce bombardment on the Russian position. By 2 p.m. the obstacles were destroyed by the Pioneers, and the position occupied shortly afterwards. It was, however, only lightly held, for on the evening of the 1st the Russians had retired, leaving rear-guards only in the position, who fell back to the forts after the capture of the position.

Some counter attacks by the Russians, in a southeasterly direction, during the 1st were beaten off by the guard and 10th Division (4th Army).

For the 2nd Kuropatkin had ordered his great counter attack. But while the 2nd Division held


desperately to their ground, the 12th Division extended to the right to envelop the left of the XVII. Corps, and in doing so struck Orloff's advance from the coal-mines. Orloff, who was advancing carelessly, was absolutely cut to pieces. The remnants of Orloff fell back on Stakelberg's I. Corps, which, after a very long march, succeeding most desperate fighting, was beginning to arrive. The net result was that Kuropatkin's great scheme failed.

Meantime the attacks of the 2nd and 4th Armies on the bridge-head at Liauyang were repulsed with great loss. The 3rd and 4th Divisions were ordered to pass the forts by the west, but failed to do much. Mischenko and Greboff fought hard, and the two divisions were drawn into the fight for the bridge-head. Had the 4th Division carried out its mission, and refused to turn into the fight, it might have succeeded in cutting off some of the Russians when on the night of the 3rd they withdrew.


The morning of the 3rd found that the Japanese 2nd Division had driven back the XVII. Corps by a night attack, and General Kuropatkin issued orders for the retreat.

In the words of Löffler: "The success of a fight is the sum of the successes in the different parts of the field. The reports of success or failure have a very great effect on the mind of the commander, even against his will. Further, after a protracted fight there is a difficulty in collecting forces, all

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG



..... Russian position 23rd August
 ——— First line prepared position
 - - - - - Second — do — do —



of which considerations operate on the mind of the general. The truth of these statements is shown in this battle, for the sum of failures counterbalanced the successful position, and induced Kuropatkin to look to his rear. Also, the scattering of his forces made it difficult to collect men to take advantage of the opportunity of the moment."

I. Siberian Army Corps and remains of Orloff's Division were to cover the right, marching by the Yentai Coal-mines with Samssonoff's Cavalry.

Behind the I. Corps marched the III. in a north-west direction, and X. and XVII. on the Mandarin Road. A rear-guard remained till the 4th at Sachutun. The retreat commenced on the evening of the 3rd, after the destruction of the depots and bridges.

Kuroki could do nothing. The 2nd and 4th Armies, in spite of their gallantry and heavy losses, were held off by the rear-guards in the forts, and at 10.0 p.m., when these were carried, they were practically abandoned by the Russians. It was not until 1.30 p.m. on the 4th that Kuroki thoroughly understood the position; mist and a break in his telegraphic connection with headquarters held him fast. When he did advance, his worn-out troops could do nothing with the rear-guards. The 2nd and 4th Armies threw bridges on this day.

The battle cost the Russians about 20,000, the Japanese 21,600 men. Though a success it was no victory, for there was no pursuit and no demoralis-

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ation of the vanquished. Kuropatkin had undoubtedly had a chance of overwhelming Kuroki ; on the other hand, he was falling back on to reserves, drawing the Japanese after him away from their base. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief's tactics may be open to criticism. It is a question whether the position could not have been turned, and, when the result of Kuroki's successful passage of the river was seen, it was strange to go on butting at the wall of the main position, and not only not support Kuroki but actually to weaken him by holding one of his divisions on the south bank.

On both sides there were mistakes made, but when the state of the country is remembered it cannot be said that they were extraordinary. It is easy to say that Kuroki missed his opportunity on the 27th while Bilderling was crossing the Tanho. The passages were within easy gun range of the hills on the east bank, but the country over which the guns were to be brought would, by all descriptions, have baffled even English drivers, let alone Japanese with poor horses. Again, it is easy to say that Kuropatkin should have taken his opportunity to overwhelm Kuroki's isolated division on the north bank of Taitseho, but his reserves had already been put into the fight and replaced by Stakelberg's exhausted troops from Shoushanpu.

These troops had fought as few men can fight ; indeed, their courage and tenacity were only equalled by that of their attackers.

There is no doubt, too, that General Orloff's careless impetuosity greatly imperilled Kuropatkin's left and line of retreat. Löffler says that had Orloff been successful, his action would have been held up as a shining example of subordinate initiative. Other accounts attribute to him the panic that seized his troops, for it was only five Japanese battalions that actually cut up and put to flight his 11 battalions with 18 guns.

General Sir Ian Hamilton's criticism of the strategy of the series of operations leading to the battle of Liauyang, is entirely favourable to the Japanese. He says: "The first point which strikes me is the clear, simple and direct character of the Japanese strategy, carried out though it has been on a grandiose scale." Again: "I believe that Liauyang was selected as the point of concentration of the three armies from the very commencement of the campaign, and that all arrangements were subservient to the end of doing precisely what we have just attempted to do here." He goes on to say, that though this was so, yet the headquarters during the advance thought—first, that the battle would have to be fought at Kaiping, then at Anshantien while Kuroki was held at Anping, and it was not till 26th August that they found their original scheme would after all be carried out. General Sir Ian Hamilton compares the scheme to that of the campaign in Bohemia in 1866 and in this relation points out that "strategi-

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cally no doubt the dangers and advantages of such a plan remain substantially unmodified, but tactically the prizes of a successful concentration are greater, whilst its realisation is more difficult. The reason the prizes are greater is that with magazine rifles, smokeless powder and an artillery, which carries 5 or 6 miles, an army half surrounded, even if only by an equal force, finds itself at a great disadvantage." Similarly, as he shows, the same causes operate to make the realisation of such a scheme more difficult.

For these reasons Sir Ian is of opinion that Kuropatkin should have, while holding Oku and Nodzu on the 26th, struck with all his might at Kuroki and staked his all in a victory on the right bank of the Tanho, and is of opinion that the Anshan-tien position could have been forced with difficulty, and only after many days fighting. As Sir Ian admits, many people think that the other alternative, to hold Kuroki and crush Oku and Nodzu would have been preferable, and though he does not agree, he admits the force of the argument, and goes on: "The remarkable point for consideration is that it appears doubtful Kuropatkin ever, fairly faced the problem. . . . Indeed, difficult as it is to believe such a thing, it almost seems as if Kuropatkin had failed to grasp the full significance of the Japanese strategical scheme." In these last sentences we have the kernel of the matter.

Most of the critics are agreed that Kuropatkin's tactical dispositions show merely a desire to show a firm defensive line against the Japanese assaults, but is this quite fair to Kuropatkin? If we study his orders for the 30th August we find that he held as a reserve 2 Army Corps and a Cavalry Division at Liauyang behind his right flank. General Sir Ian Hamilton blames Kuropatkin for not making dispositions for the defence of his left, yet in these same army orders we see the left flank placed under the protection of Bilderling with the XVII. Corps, supported by portions of the V. Corps, and the flank was further covered by a great river. Meunier admits that Kuropatkin still had in hand the best part of 3 corps on the 1st September when the Japanese were already nearly brought to a standstill. The fact is, that the Japanese tactical plan failed almost entirely. Kuroki's advance across the Taitseho was an afterthought, and were Oyama's reputation as an exponent of grand tactics to rest on his conduct of Liauyang, his claim to distinction would not be so justly high as it now stands.

Yet it is to be noted that the Japanese strategical success, so well pointed out by Sir Ian Hamilton, prevented Kuropatkin from availing himself of his favourable tactical position. It has always been hard to change from defensive to offensive, it is harder than ever now.

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF THE SHAHO

KUROPATKIN retired rapidly from Liauyang on Mukden, his left assured by Stakelberg with the I. Siberian Corps and his main body covered by the Cavalry. He then took up a position on the right bank of the Shaho, which runs in a deep valley, leaving the cavalry on the left (south) bank to watch the Japanese.

The Japanese were unable to organise an effective pursuit, and followed leisurely, contenting themselves at first with pushing advance guards on to the line, Yentai-Bianyupusa.

Both armies now re-organised. On the 24th September the Czar issued a Rescript appointing General Grippenbergh to command a 2nd Army, "under the general directions" of Kuropatkin. The I. European Corps and part of the VI. Siberian were already at Mukden. The VIII. was ordered to mobilise at Odessa, and it was proposed to send the IV. and XVI. European Corps and five brigades of rifles besides further cavalry reinforcements and the necessary personnel and material to replace casualties. The Japanese also received large reinforcements of personnel to replace

THE BATTLE OF THE SHAHO 79

casualties, and on the 2nd October the opposing forces were :

Russians.

I., II., III., IV., V., VI. Siberian Corps.

I., VI., X., XVII. European Corps.

Three Divisions and two Brigades of Cossacks.

The Caucasian Cavalry Brigade,

Certain other Cavalry Troops attached to the
Army Corps as Corps Cavalry.

The total amounted to 220,000, of which about 18,000 were Cavalry, and 900 guns.

Japanese.

1st Army—Guard, 2nd, 12th Divisions, with two Reserve Brigades and Cavalry and Artillery Brigades.

2nd Army—5th, 10th Divisions, with perhaps a Reserve Brigade.

4th Army—3rd, 4th, 6th Divisions, with probably one or two Reserve Brigades, Cavalry and Artillery Brigades.

The total amounted to about 160,000 men and 650 guns. The 1st Army was still based on Antung and Korea, though apparently for certain supplies it relied on the railway, the 2nd Army on Inkou, the 4th Army on Taliénwan.


On the 29th of September a law was passed turning the Home Defence Troops into Reserve Troops,

Jap. Reserves

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and the men were therefore available as reinforcements for the divisions at the front, while at least two new Reserve Divisions were formed, one of which garrisoned Korea, and one appears at Mukden.

It may be as well to state here that no really reliable information is yet public about the Japanese reserve formations. Most of the Reserve Brigades



up to this time at the front, and on the communications, were mixed brigades, *i.e.*, brigades of all arms.

The efforts that Japan put forth to provide men are most interesting. Men were, of course, forthcoming, but hundreds of thousands of men are not soldiers, nor hundreds of thousands of soldiers an

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army, without organisation or trained officers and non-commissioned officers.

It is easy to provide men, even during the course of a war if it is of any duration, but to train them when all the instructors are required in the fighting line is well-nigh impossible. Further, to train officers and non-commissioned officers, except during the course of an exceptionally long war, such as the North and South Civil War in America, is impossible. In that war, both sides started equally untrained, though the South had the better material, particularly for cavalry, while the north disposed of such regular troops as there were. It was four months before either side could move, and then the result of the battle of Bull Run showed how quite unreliable were the troops on either side, though they were States Militia and Volunteers for the most part.

The Japanese Reserve Brigades were afterwards made up to nearly the strength of divisions as far as possible, but owing to lack of regimental officers, the regiments had fewer battalions than those of the active divisions.

The advanced line of the Japanese was accurately known at the Russian headquarters: it was from the Hunho, north of the branch line to the Yentai Coal-Mines as far as Bianyupusa. Behind this line the dispositions of the Japanese were unknown. Apparently the main strength of the enemy lay between the Shaho and the Bianyupusa-Ponsihu road.

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On the 2nd October Kuropatkin issued his famous order, saying that he was about to take the offensive against Oyama.

Roughly speaking, the railway (and Mandarin road) north of Liauyang marks the boundary of the mountainous country. West is a wide plain thickly covered with villages; east is mountainous country broken by deep water-courses, affluents of the Taitseho and Liaoho.

Kuropatkin divided his army into three, consisting of:—

Western Group—Bilderling, with X., XVII., part V. Siberian Corps to operate from the direction, Mukden on Liauyang.

Eastern Group—Stalkelberg, Samssonoff's Cavalry, I., III. Siberian, part of II., IV., V. Siberian Corps to operate from the direction, Fuchun on Ponsihu.

General Reserve—I. European, VI. Siberian, parts II., IV. Siberian Corps.

The communication between the two wings was to be kept up by Mischenko's Cossacks and a division of the X. Corps. Grekoff watched the right flank, while Rennenkampf, with his division of Cossacks and strong infantry supports, operated wide on the left.

From a consideration of these arrangements we must suppose either that Kuropatkin thought that the Japanese extended high up the Taitseho, and that by a movement on Ponsihu he would break

their, as he supposed, over-extended line, or else that he deliberately proposed to outflank their right, though this would have only had the effect of throwing the Japanese back on to the railway.

On the 4th October the Russians moved. Bilderling advanced slowly and cautiously to gain room for the troops in the hills, entrenching each position that he occupied; advancing in this way, he reached the Shiliho on the 9th IV. Corps near Yansansai. Stakelberg moved in two columns—the right on Bianyupusa, the left further east. Rennenkampf still further east moved from the Kautulin Pass south-eastwards to outflank the Japanese. Rennenkampf's total force was 24 squadrons, 16 battalions and 60 guns.

On the 8th Stakelberg's left column, with Samssonoff's cavalry, came out on the Taitseho, where they met Rennenkampf's column well above Ponsihu. While these troops were pushing on to Ponsihu on the 9th, Stakelberg drove in the Japanese advance troops from Bianyupusa, and the III. Corps was engaged near the Hualin Pass. On the 10th Stakelberg attacked Shunpintaitse. Kuroki was in great danger, but Ponsihu was saved by the cavalry under Prince Kanin, and Rennenkampf displayed no vigour. Gradually, by sheer hard fighting, Kuroki wore the Russians out. By the evening of the 10th the Russians were on a line 5,000 yards north of the Yentai to Coal-mine branch line, but it was already reported that the

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Japanese were taking the offensive. The weakness of his centre had forced Kuropatkin to put the IV. Corps there at Yansansai.

During these days Kuroki had been in very great danger. His line was too much extended, but the reports on his right and in front led him as early as the 4th to fear for Umezawa's Guard Reserve Brigade, and as Oyama had now also some fear of a Russian offensive, Kuroki's left was relieved by Nodzu, Umezawa withdrawn to the south-west on the 7th, and the 12th Division extended to close the gap. Kanin, with the cavalry brigade, relieved Chaotao, an important point on the line of communications, on the 10th, and Ponsihu on the 12th.

Oyama considered that the time had arrived for the counter-stroke.

On the 11th, Oku and Nodzu both advanced, the left of Nodzu and right of Oku on Ulitaitse, and by evening Oku's centre had reached Yandiawan, and his left a line Yudiatentse - Lidiatun, with some advanced troops at Sandepu. Kuroki had stood fast.

On the 12th, Kuroki drove the IV. Siberian Corps out of their position at Yansansai, while Stakelberg could make no advance against the remainder of his troops. The result of the defeat of the IV. Corps was that Stakelberg had to put his reserve into the gap between his army and that of Bilderling.

Meanwhile, Oku and Nodzu attacked, Oku about

Orchidiasa and Alige to Shiliho, Nodzu further west.

The fight was a general Japanese success, for the whole Russian right was forced back, and the defeat of the IV. Corps weakened the Russian centre.

Kuropatkin brought up his reserve for a counter attack, but it failed and evening found the western, Russian wing in retreat. To form a new reserve, the I. Siberian Corps was withdrawn from the left, and on the 13th took up its position near Losantun.

On the 13th, the Japanese again advanced, and Kuroki could make no headway against the left Russian Army and IV. Corps; while Nodzu became so hotly engaged with the X. and part I. European Corps, that Oku had to assist him, first with the 6th Division and then with the 4th Division. It has been said that Oku would have helped more by a determined advance, but this is surely carping criticism.

The X. Army Corps, with a division of the I. Army Corps, whose gallantry had partially retrieved the disaster of the 12th, was gradually forced back by Nodzu, while Kuroki forced back the IV. Siberian Corps. The left of this Corps, indeed, was only saved by a portion of the main reserve, the Wyborg Regiment (I. Army Corps). By evening the Japanese were in the gap between the IV. Siberian Corps and X. Army Corps—that is, between the eastern and western groups. The retreat of the X. Army Corps caused Kuropatkin

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to order the IV. Siberian Corps to withdraw during the night.

On the next day Shahopu was taken by the Japanese, and retaken; taken again and retaken by the 86th and 88th Regiments, who, sent up specially by Kuropatkin, who watched the fight from the "hill-top with the tree," afterwards known as Putiloff Hill, drove the Japanese two kilometres south of the village.


Severe but fruitless fighting took place on the west. Stakelberg re-established communication between the eastern and central groups on the road Bianyupusa - Fushun. But though the front was closed again, all hope of success was gone.

On the 15th Bilderling tried again, but unsuccessfully, to take the offensive. In the evening, by a surprise attack, the Japanese retook Shahopu, and seized the "hill-top with the tree."


On the 16th the Russians again attempted to take this commanding height. Late in the evening General Putiloff, with a force collected on the field, captured the height, and with it 14 Japanese guns. Oku again attacked Bilderling on the north bank of the Shaho unsuccessfully.

On the 17th there was not much fighting, but the Japanese retook Shahopu.

On the 19th fighting ceased along the whole line, and on the 21st the Japanese evacuated Shahopu without fighting. The losses on either side were :



Battles of the Shaho



—Russians killed, wounded and missing, 41,500; Japanese, 16,000.

The extraordinary disproportion in the losses is accounted for by Meunier by the skilful use of the Japanese of their artillery in the preparation of the attack, as much as to the skill of their infantry in the use of ground. It is difficult to altogether agree with the former part of this statement. Taking all the accounts together, and in particular General Sir Ian Hamilton's remarkable account of the action of Kuroki's army, it would appear that the skilful use of artillery was rather on the Russian than the Japanese side, but that the skilful use of ground by the infantry was entirely the property of the Japanese. Every fold, every tuft of grass was made use of. Enfilade fire by two or three men sometimes cleared a bit of ground without loss, that otherwise might have taken many lives. Night attacks were freely employed by the Japanese. As regards the conduct of the battle, General Sir Ian Hamilton points out that Stakelberg's line of communication was at right angles to his line of operations—or in other words, that he had to march round the circumference of a semi-circle to get to his objective. Had his line of communications been from Fushun like his line of operations, his task would have been possible of accomplishment.

The soundness of this criticism is obvious, when we consider the effect that the defeat of IV. Corps at Yansansai had on Stakelberg.

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Löffler criticises the general conduct of the battle as follows:—

"It seems that Kuropatkin put in his greatest force towards the east. The distance, and high and rugged mountains that separated his two wings, made communication well-nigh impossible. The Japanese had had plenty of time to prepare positions. A mark of all tactical operations in the mountains, such as those before Stakelberg, is the length of time movements take, the great difficulties of observation, the difficulty of employing artillery, and the fact that the numberless positions enable small forces to delay large ones. It is true that the defender also feels the difficulties of movement, but time is in his hands, for he holds the enemy with weak forces, and concentrates for counter attacks behind this screen. Operations, where part of a force are operating in the hills and part in the plains, are obviously still more difficult to connect. The Japanese must hold their communications with Dalny, and this would be threatened by a movement in the plains. Also, their heavy gun and their numerical superiority would tell more in the plains in the Russian favour. It is, therefore, questionable whether an advance by the west, with the eastern wing withheld, would not have been preferable to the course actually taken. Further, more reinforcements were constantly arriving from Europe, which could be used to reinforce the east and centre against a counter-blow by the Japanese.

"Probably it was possible danger to the communications with Tieling that decided Kuropatkin to advance by the east, though this seems a very weak reason. The detachments that tried to work round the Japanese wings and threaten the communications were valueless. They were not strong enough, or else too strong. When decisive fighting is toward, such detachments are better with their corps, unless, indeed, they are exclusively cavalry. The Japanese proved the foregoing statements to be correct by their action.

"In bold and masterly fashion, Oyama, holding the eastern force in check, closed with the western. The Russians had some success in the hills, neutralised by defeat in the plains, and had to reinforce their western wing, which went very near to suffering a disaster."

These criticisms of Löffler are similar to these of Sir Ian Hamilton, and may therefore be taken as sound. Sir Ian Hamilton says that if he had been in the position of Kuropatkin he would have amused the Japanese right and attacked their left, turning it by a force consisting of all the cavalry supported by an infantry division. He also says that Kuropatkin must have known Kuroki's strength and weakness, and might have struck in on his left boldly, which would have almost certainly broken the Japanese line.

It has been said, probably correctly, that Kuropatkin's action in attacking at the Shaho was

due to the necessity to re-establish the morale of his troops. The Russian peasant is probably of all men the last man likely to have his morale shaken by defeat. History has proved that the Muscovite is never so dangerous as when defeated, but yet even this fine material must be shaken by successive retirements. It is no use telling the soldier that his retreat was to improve the strategical position, or that he has inflicted severe losses on his enemy. He wants the tangible evidence of advance over the captured positions and dead bodies of his opponent to convince him of the truth.

The state of discipline in the British Army during the retreat after the slight repulse at Burgos, is a proof of this fact. Kuropatkin sought to re-establish his troops' morale. What must have been the effect of his failure on his men, already partially demoralised, and without their hearts in the business? There is no doubt that the lack of political enthusiasm for their cause weakened the Russian energies throughout the campaign.

The armies entrenched, facing each other, and the standstill was not broken before the New Year, which brought with it the fall of Port Arthur, and to this part of the theatre of war we must now return.

On the 25th October, Alexieff was recalled, and Kuropatkin put in supreme command. In spite of his lack of tactical successes, Kuropatkin was still implicitly trusted by the court, the people, and the army.

CHAPTER VI

THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR

On the 26th May, 1904, Oku had attacked General Stoessel in his entrenchments at Nanshan, covering the isthmus which leads to the peninsula on which Port Arthur stands.

After a bloody engagement, the entrenchments were occupied by the Japanese, and the Russians retired to their lines outside Port Arthur.

Oku now turned to advance towards the north, while General Nogi, with the 1st and 11th Divisions, advanced towards Port Arthur to invest the Fortress.

Nogi occupied Dalny 30th May without hindrance, and after clearing the harbour of mines, formed his base at this place and landed there his siege train, the 9th Division, and two Reserve Brigades.

The Russians had, as we have seen, utilised the three months' grace since the commencement of the war to good purpose. They had increased the garrison until it amounted, apparently, to about 45,000 men, including some 5,000 volunteers and three sotnias of Cossacks, with 500 guns, of which 200 were heavy pieces; they had sent in immense supplies of ammunition and arms, and

filled the store-houses to overflowing. All kinds of material for the construction of forts, repair of ships and guns, installation of electric lights, telephonic communications, etc., had been despatched, and the garrison had not wasted its time.

In addition to the troops, the garrison included the remains of the Pacific Squadron, on board of which were about 10,000 sailors, and these men and the armament of the ships were utilised later in the defence of the Fortress. General Stoessel was in command, with Kondratenko as chief engineer.

At the time of the outbreak of war, the permanent defences, except on the seaward side, had not been completed, but during these months this had been done, and new lines had been constructed, until the defences occupied the positions shown in the sketch. Massive redoubts of strong profile and great thickness of earth parapet were placed in every advantageous position, and while cover was provided for the men until the enemy's infantry should arrive near the forts, entanglements and mines were arranged to delay the assaulting troops.

The Russians have always been among the staunchest defenders and the most skilful constructors of fortifications in Europe, and the task of the Japanese was certain to be a most formidable one, and General Kondratenko proved to be a second Todleben.

The arrangements for the siege were not hastened, and they were not completed until the middle of July.

On the 25th June, the Army had advanced, and by the night of the 27th and 28th June the line of Russian field works had been captured or abandoned by the enemy.

On the 3rd and 4th July, an attempt was made by the garrison to recapture these positions, which threatened Dalny, but though the attack was most obstinately maintained for two days and two nights, it failed. The Russians now occupied the first line shown on the plan, extending from Triple Peaks to the sea on the south.

On the 26th July, without any really adequate artillery preparation, an assault was made on these positions, and continued during the 27th and 28th, both by day and night. On the 26th the Russian Fleet endeavoured to assist the defence on the right flank, but was obliged by the Japanese Fleet to retire under shelter of the guns of the Fortress. The Japanese Fleet then assisted the attack on the Russian right.

The fighting, which was almost continuous by day and night along the whole line, was of the most desperate character, and nothing could have exceeded the gallantry of the Japanese Infantry, which, not appalled by terrible losses, pursued the assault right up to the obstacles, even succeeding in destroying many of them. The assaults were, however, generally unsuccessful, until they at last succeeded in outflanking the Russian left, when the whole line of defences became dangerous, and the

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Russians fell back to their second line—Green Mountain, Wolfs Mountain, High Mountain, Long Mountain. This position, it will be observed, is nearly eight miles long, and proved too extended, and their left flank having again been turned, the Russians evacuated this line also, and fell back to their third line, which is shown in the map.

From this time the siege of the actual Fortress may be said to have commenced.

It will be seen that the defences on the landward side are divided broadly into two divisions, east and west of the valley of the Lunho, through which runs the railway and the road. This valley is about a mile wide. The eastern section shows an almost continuous enceinte of great redoubts connected by deep trenches, with advanced works closely connected with the enceinte, and powerful forts on hills behind the line. The western section does not afford a well-marked line, but every hill was covered by a powerful fort, affording one another mutual support, and covering lines of entrenchments were made on every spur or bit of rising ground. Both flanks connect with the seaward batteries. The valley was covered by several forts, of which the most important were those about Suichiyin, and Fort Kuropatkin.

On the night 7th-8th isolated forts in advance of the Russian right on the Takoshan Mountain were stormed, and there was severe fighting about Suichiyin, but the attacks failed. Meanwhile

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positions for the siege guns were being prepared.

The losses on the Japanese side had up to this point been about 9,000 men killed and wounded. The force at General Nogi's disposal now amounted to 3 Active Divisions, 2 Reserve Brigades, the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, and a siege train; in all about 65,000.

The siege train consisted of:—

28 4·7-inch Howitzers.

40 4·7-inch Guns.

72 6-inch Mortars.

24 3·5-inch Mortars.

16 6-inch Howitzers.

4 4·1-inch Guns.

With the exception of the 6-inch Howitzers, very few of these weapons were adequately powerful for the task before them, a clear proof that the exigencies of the siege had not been so carefully thought out by the Japanese staff as almost every other detail of the military organisation, though it is true that some siege guns were on one of the ships sunk by the Vladivostok cruiser squadron.

From the 9th to the 19th there was heavy but desultory cannonading, combined with infantry assaults along the whole front, but the Japanese attacks were generally unsuccessful. One on the 9th on Angle Mountain failed, though some detached works extending towards Louisa Bay were occupied.

By the 19th the whole of the Japanese Siege

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Artillery was in action, and from the 19th to the 24th the Japanese Infantry made a heroic attempt, continued night and day for five days, to storm the line of works. The line of attack was on both sides of the Lunho Valley. On the right the works of Angle Mountain were occupied, while on the left the Japanese succeeded in entering the West Panlunchan Fort and capturing some of the redoubts south of Suichiyin, but a counter attack drove them back.

Finally the attack ceased, and the Japanese fell back to their lines, with a loss of 14,000 men, due partly to an inadequate preparation. One regiment was reduced to 6 officers and 208 men, from a total strength of nearly 3,000.

The force with which the Japanese had commenced the siege, viz., 3 Active and 1 Reserve Division and a siege train, probably amounted to about 65,000 men, but the terrible losses had considerably reduced the number ; these were, however, gradually made good. It is almost impossible to estimate the Russian losses at the various engagements, and no data sufficient to base calculations on are yet published.

There seems to be no doubt that this great attack was premature, and General Nogi has been much blamed for it by certain Continental critics. We do not, however, know what his orders were ; his army was certainly urgently required in Manchuria. At any rate, he now fell back on to more

formal methods of siege warfare, and divided his attack into three sections.

About this time the Japanese siege train was strengthened by the arrival of some naval guns and 8 11-inch howitzers.

The right wing attacked the north-west front, and its objective gradually became 203 Metre Hill, from which direct fire on the town and harbour could be used. The centre attacked the Erlungshan and Kikwanshan groups of forts, and the left the Kinkishan and Payiushan groups. Each section had an Active Division detailed for it.

It was most noticeable during the siege that slow sap work was almost despised by the Japanese, contrary to all modern ideas. The attacks were made in great force, and it was not until the men reached comparatively close range that they began to entrench themselves and advance by sap and mine, in some degree like the attack of the Canadians and Gordons on the laager at Paardeberg.

From the 19th to the 23rd September another general attack was made on the works on the north and north-west, as it was believed that the approaches were sufficiently far advanced and the breaches in the forts practicable. The attacks were directed on Fort Kuropatkin, which covered the town water supply, and on 203 Metre Hill.

Fort Kuropatkin and the entrenchments about Suishiyin were captured, as also was 203 Metre

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Hill. But a vigorous counter attack drove the Japanese off this last important height.

Every attempt to penetrate into the line of permanent works was repulsed with fearful loss, and wherever the Japanese did obtain a foothold they were dislodged by counter attacks. Still the material results were considerable.

After this there were four weeks of steady bombardment and approach work, broken, however, by constant advances and attacks by the Japanese, under cover of which the trenches were advanced towards the line of forts; and constant sorties by the garrison, many of which were successful in temporarily destroying the approaches.

The third general attack began on the 25th October, and lasted till the 3rd November, during the whole of which time the fighting was of the most desperate character. The attack was partly anticipated, for 2nd November is the Mikado's birthday, and Port Arthur would have been a welcome birthday present.

The attack was directed this time on the north-east and east fronts, and ran a similar course to the former ones—that is to say, that the Japanese gained entrance to several forts, and were driven out by counter attacks, so that the line remained in possession of the defenders, not, however, without being weakened, for during the attack many guns were spiked and many of the forts were seriously damaged by mines, and at any rate the besiegers

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had captured every work in front of the line of permanent forts.

On the 25th November the 7th Division arrived to reinforce the Japanese Army, and by the 17th December the siege and large naval pieces employed in the Japanese siege works had reached a total of 230, including 14 11-inch howitzers.

The Japanese had now got so close to the Russian works that the only method of approach possible was by the ordinary sap, and so parallels and approaches were laid out, and mines were dug towards the works. About the 20th November they had reached the ditch of the Erlungshan Forts, but failed to capture them. On the 26th November the fourth general storm began; the 1st and 7th Divisions attacked the north-west section, at 203 Metre Hill, and the 9th and 11th Divisions the central section, Erlungshan and Kikwanshan Forts.

The attack on the centre failed, but on the 5th December the famous 203 Metre Hill was captured, and a Russian counter attack on the 6th driven back.

Thus, at last, at fearful cost, had the Japanese made themselves masters of this all-important point, from behind which the harbour could be shelled and other works taken in reverse.


It is recorded that the hill had been under constant bombardment day and night for three months without intermission, and that there was

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not to be found a square yard on which a Japanese shell had not exploded. Constant attacks and counter attacks had made the ground a shambles, a "field of corpses," as an expressive German account has it. Löffler pertinently remarks that consideration of the artillery ammunition expended on this hill, and the fact that it was finally only taken by hand-to-hand fighting, should be proof that artillery is still only the supporting arm, sufficient to satisfy even the most bigoted of the theorists that have of late years filled the Continental military press with their lucubrations on the decisive effect modern Q.F. Artillery will have on the field of battle. The bayonet is still the last resource; that modern fights will seldom actually come to bayonet fighting is probable, but between two equally matched, equally staunch foes, it must as ever finally decide the day.

The Japanese at once proceeded to shell the harbour until the Pacific Squadron was entirely destroyed, and by the 15th December this was accomplished; while on the 18th, the "Sebastopol," which was in the outer harbour, was torpedoed.

It was evident that the heroic defence must soon be at an end, and the approaches and mines towards the north and east fronts were pushed forward, and on the 20th, after hard fighting, the northern Kikwanshan Forts were captured, and the others of this group were thereupon abandoned, and destroyed by the Russians.



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During the last few days of December the Erlungshan Forts were also captured, and considerable advance made.

On the 1st January a general storm was delivered, and the Wantai Forts were captured, with the result that at 4 p.m. of the afternoon of this day General Stoessel sent his aide-de-camp to General Nogi to inform him that he would surrender the Fortress. 25,000 unwounded, and 15,000 sick and wounded officers and men surrendered. The approximate losses during the siege were — Russians, 16,000, Japanese 60,000.

These are big figures, and it is at any rate open to argument whether the losses were worth incurring. There is no shadow of doubt that after the battle of Nanshan, two divisions at most could have blocked the escape of the Russians from the peninsula, setting free the rest of the larger force employed by the Japanese in front of the Fortress, to join the Field Army.

On the other hand, Port Arthur was of immense political and naval importance. Its capture meant the destruction of the Russian Pacific Squadron, and it would be a tangible success, which would make itself felt in that most overwhelmingly important operation of modern war—ease in borrowing the sinews of war, money.

Löffler writes: "It is apparent that no power the Japanese could place in the field could strike Russia in her heart; it was therefore necessary for them to

occupy effectually such possessions of Russia as were vulnerable to her, and in this aim the capture of Port Arthur was of the first importance. Port Arthur sheltered the Pacific Squadron of Russia, and its destruction before the arrival of the Baltic Squadron was all-important, for the command of the sea alone enabled Japan to maintain her army in the field; to assure this, the capture of the Port was the only means. Further, even in May the Russians had not so strong a force in the field as the Japanese, and certainly would not have had, had the Japanese not kept back the 7th and 8th Divisions. These considerations were sufficient to make the capture of the Port of first importance, even though its capture would have no effect on the Field Armies."

Of the tactical conduct of the operations it is not so easy to write favourably. The key of the Fortress was obviously the Erlungshan and Kikwanshan group of forts. Their capture laid the place bare, and opened the 203 Metre Hill to attack in reverse. Yet the front was divided into three portions, and the strength of the besieging force wasted on this wide extension.

There seems little doubt that had the whole force been concentrated for the attack of one point, the Fortress would have fallen sooner.

Further, the artillery was to some extent wasted throughout the siege in shooting at random into the harbour in order to damage the warships. With

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the capture of the forts went the capture of the ships, and all the force of the artillery should have been concentrated against the points to be attacked.

Briefly, there was a waste of force, both by a too extensive front of attack, and by misdirection of power.

Of the heroism of both sides it is difficult to write in terms of moderation. The Russians fighting a hopeless fight, suffering from the invariable unhealthy accompaniments of a siege, outnumbered by two to one; the Japanese Infantry sacrificing themselves to break the obstacles for their comrades to advance, or forcing their way to the very ditches of the forts to throw hand grenades, continuing the attacks amid the most awful carnage, both were equally to be admired.

The soul of the defence was General Kondratenko, who was killed in a casemate of one of the Kikwan-shan Forts on the 15th December, in company with several other officers, by a bursting shell.

The capture of the Fortress released 4 Active Divisions for the Field Army, and the defence of the Port was handed over to reserve troops.

CHAPTER VII

THE BATTLE OF SANDEPU (OR HOKUTAI)

WITH the New Year and the fall of Port Arthur, 4 Japanese Active Divisions were set free to join the Field Army, which they did in about a month.

On the Russian side, the 1st, 2nd and 5th Rifle Brigades, and five and a half Brigades of the XVI. Corps had arrived, and on the 29th January the 3rd and 4th Rifle Brigades and 3 Divisions of the IV. Army Corps began to leave Russia, and arrived during March and the first half of April. Large numbers of Reservists to replace losses, were also despatched.

Thus the arrival of Nogi's Army did not turn the balance of numbers to the Japanese side of the scale.

The scarcity of officers was much felt, and it was useless to promote non-commissioned officers wholesale, for this only transferred the shortage to another rank. The difficulty was met by increasing the strength of the companies, and whereas the ordinary war strength of a Japanese company is 250, they were at the time of the battle of Mukden increased to 280, or even 300 men, by filling them up with reservists and recruits. It would appear then that, allowing for Garrison Troops in

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occupation of Korea, and the Lines of Communication Troops, that the Japanese had, about the time of the Battle of Sandepu, or soon after,

- 13 Active Divisions,
- 7 Reserve Brigades,
- 2 Reserve Divisions,
- 2 Cavalry Brigades,
- 2 Artillery Brigades,

that is, about 300,000 to 310,000 men, with 900 to 950 guns.

It is very instructive to note that the Japanese, whose organisation was wonderful, preferred to increase the strength of the cadres rather than form new units of semi-trained men, led by semi-trained officers and N.C.O.'s, a lesson which might well be taken to heart by us in view of our methods in South Africa, though the evils of the other system were manifest in the Federal Armies in '61-65. However, the new Territorial Army Scheme appears designed to meet our needs in this direction, if the officers are forced to learn their duties.

Until the third week in January the position in Southern Manchuria remained as it had been in October, though the front of both entrenched armies had extended. Except for outpost affairs, only one considerable movement was made. This was a march of a strong body of Russian cavalry under Mischenko against the Japanese communications, and took place in the first days of January.

The force detailed for this raid consisted of some

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5,000 Cossacks with 6 batteries of Horse Artillery, some machine guns, engineers, and a train of more than 1,000 carts, a number which seems excessive in a country where supplies were fairly plentiful. The force was divided into 3 columns, under Samssonoff, Abramoff and Tieleschoff. The rivers were frozen, the weather good, and both men and horses in hard condition. The force started on the 8th January, and reached the confluence of the Hun and Liao Rivers by the night of the 9th, 70 miles south of Mukden. During the night fires are said to have broken out and been taken up from village to village, acting as beacons for the Japanese, and said to have been previously arranged for with the Chinese to give warning of a Russian raid. On the morning of the 10th, 500 Chungouzes (Chinese brigands, said to have been employed as scouts by the Japanese) were encountered and charged by a Regiment of Daghestan Cossacks, who succeeded in killing about 100 and driving the others away in panic. Advancing south, the Russians came upon a village occupied by about 200 Japanese. The Verkhoyudinski Cossacks succeeded in capturing the village on foot by a night attack. The Brigade of Cossacks of the Caucasus was despatched to break the railway to the north of Haicheng to prevent the arrival of troops from the south. On the 11th the troops attacked Old Nieuchang about midday. Sixty Japanese took refuge in a building and refused to yield. They were left. Several

convoys were captured and burnt. The Japanese, or their agents, continued to burn villages in the wake of the Russian columns, whose track was thus marked by pillars of cloud by day and pillars of fire by night.

The night of the 11th-12th was passed in some villages 18 miles east of Inkou. During this time the Caucasian Cossack Brigade had destroyed 500 yards of railway, and the Dragoons had partially destroyed the bridge at Tashichao, and cut the telegraph. On the 12th, Mischenko burnt the store-houses near Inkou, and attacked the station defended by about 1,000 Japanese without artillery but entrenched. The 6 Russian Horse Artillery Batteries opened fire upon the station, and set some of the buildings on fire, but in spite of the gallantry of the troops, the attack, continued till nightfall, failed, because, says the report, the Cavalry had no bayonets. General Mischenko retired, taking his wounded with him. A considerable force had been despatched from Haicheng to cut off the Russians' retreat, but Mischenko evaded them, and on the 15th was safe behind the Russian outpost line.

"Here was a raid organised and conducted with skill and energy, and without tangible result. In the present state of European Cavalry, none would have succeeded better."

Such is the dictum of General Negrier, and his explanation is most interesting ; he says :—

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"We cannot put the failure of the enterprise to lack of vigour, but to the fact that the cavalry lacked the necessary indispensable arm—a howitzer or light mortar, the only thing which can make a village untenable. The 36 guns in action at the station of Inkow, like Samssonoff's guns at Senontchen, had no effect. The question is judged. The cavalry must have a certain number of howitzers, or light mortars, firing a shell of big capacity containing high explosives. Also, the troopers must be armed with the bayonet. Napoleon gave out the following order in his decree of the 12th February, 1812: 'The Musketeers will be armed with a bayonet, with the scabbard attached to the sword-belt, as with the Dragoons.'"

The opinion of General Negrier carries so much weight that the above statement merits consideration, though we have already discarded the theory that cavalry are only foot soldiers on horses. There was much sense in the old joke against the dragoons who were described in an official handbook as "men who fight indifferently on horse or foot," for a man can hardly be expected to do both really equally well. At any rate, the raid had but little effect. It would seem that such enterprises fail of their effect during periods of inactivity in the operation, and particularly when the magazines near the fighting troops have a large reserve. Raids reached their apotheosis probably in the

War of Secession in '61-64. Time and again were the Federal movements checked by the confederate raids of Stewart in the east, and of Forrest and Morgan in the west. But once the Federals had mastered the fact that a reserve of supplies at the front would make them temporarily independent of lines of communication, the raids failed of their full object. Morgan and Forrest failed to arrest Sherman's advance on Atlanta, or weaken Buell's hold on Nashville. Further, Mischenko's force was too big. A few squadrons would have done as much as his 60 accomplished. Possibly this raid, like many other proceedings of the Russians, resulted from political pressure. "Attacking the enemies communications," "appearing in rear of the enemy," sound well in despatches.

The positions occupied by the two armies at this time are shown, in general, on the plan for the battle of Mukden facing page 124. The Japanese right was near Ponsihu on the Taitseho, and extended in a vast arc by Bianyupusa—along the left bank of the Shaho to Linchinpu—Lidiantun—Sandepu—Hokutai, with detachments watching the Hunho by Liaobeiho back to Liauyang. The Russians occupied the right bank of the Shaho, and at Linchinpu the two lines were only separated by a few hundred yards.

The right of the Russian line from Shantan was held by the 2nd Army under Gripenberg, and consisted of I. Siberian VIII., X. Corps,

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3 brigades of rifles, and 2 brigades of Cossacks.

The Japanese left was still Oku's 2nd Army. The Russian left was covered by Mischenko's Cavalry.

On the 19th January Kuropatkin issued his orders for an attack in a long dissertation, in which, as Meunier says, "the fear of compromising himself is shown in every word, and the battle arranged in advance as if it were a ballet," and afterwards gave detailed instructions to his subordinates in person, and issued definite orders to the 2nd Army to attack. The I. Siberian and $\frac{1}{2}$ VIII. Corps were on the right bank of the Hunho facing south, $\frac{1}{2}$ VIII. on the left bank facing south-east and joining the remainder of the corps at Shantan; the X. Corps prolonged the line of the VIII. Corps to the east (left) facing south. The 3 brigades of rifles forming the Rifle Corps were in reserve.

Kuropatkin held the III. Siberian, XVI. and 72 Division as a "strategic" reserve about Suiatun and Biatapu, and generally interfered with Grippenbergs movements.

Oku had the 3rd and 4th Divisions in the front line with the 5th Division in reserve near Yentai. The 8th Division, which formed the Army reserve, was on the railway. The cavalry were on the west of the Hunho covering the left.

The Russian attack commenced on the 25th, and in consequence of its slow development, cannot have surprised the Japanese.

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The I. Siberian Army Corps crossed the Hunho on the ice and attacked Hokutai, which, after fierce fighting, fell into the hands of the Russians about 11 p.m. Mischenko forced the Japanese cavalry over the Hunho.

On the 26th the VIII. European Army Corps attempted to take Sandepu.

The 14th Division, which was on the right bank of the Hunho, advanced by Yantaitse; the 15th Division from the northward.

A brigade of the I. Siberian Corps sought to support from Hokutai. The X. Corps, under orders apparently from Kuropatkin himself, again on the 26th remained halted in their trenches, contented with a cannonade and desultory infantry skirmishing.

By 6 p.m. the town was in the hands of the Russians, except one strongly placed redoubt, which was most skilfully covered with obstacles.

As the village was burning, it was abandoned, with the intention of destroying the redoubt next day with artillery fire.

On the 27th and 28th, desultory and varying, though severe, fighting took place.

In order to meet the Russian attack, Oyama moved his reserve, 8th Division, and one reserve brigade from Yentai on to Hokutai, and placed the 3rd Division under the orders of the commander of this force. By the 29th the 8th Division was in line.

When the full extent of the Russian attack was

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seen, the 2nd Division was moved from the right (Kuroki) to assist. On the 28th Oku struck in with the 5th Division. The Russian attack had been brought to a standstill, and still the 3rd and 1st Armies made no move. The Japanese took the offensive, but by the evening of the 28th had made but little progress ; while the X. Corps having come into action, placed Oku's Army in a dangerous position.

However, Kuropatkin's heart failed him, and, though the situation was favourable for breaking the Japanese left had he only hardened his heart and put in his main reserve, early on the 29th Gripenberg was ordered to withdraw.

By 9.30 a.m. Hokutai was again in Japanese hands. The Russians remained on the heights of Shantanhonan until the 2nd February, when they were driven out by a surprise attack, but they soon retook the heights.

At the same time as this engagement was taking place, Mischenko, with his cavalry and the 54th Reserve Division, made a southward sweep to attack the enemy's rear.

This enveloping force seized the villages of Shitaitse and Mamikai on the 25th, and there left the infantry.

The cavalry, which crossed the Hunho on the 26th, after a number of successful skirmishes with weak detachments of Japanese, advanced eastwards. They reached on the 27th the neighbourhood of

Landungou and southwards without their presence having any apparent effect on the main battle. The date of Mischenko's withdrawal is not known, but must have coincided with the cessation of the main fight.

The Russians lost about 14,000, the Japanese about 9,500 in this fight, and during it the 1st and 3rd Russian Armies remained in their trenches, while the men were occupied in exercise drill in close formations, and only a few guns fired a few rounds.

Except the small engagement on the 2nd before mentioned, quiet settled down again on the battlefield until the end of February. The only result of the fight of Sandepu was the further extension of the Russian entrenched line westwards, until it covered a line as the crow flies of 57 miles from Syfantai to Matsiundan, and this excluding the flanking detachments.

Towards the end of February, the movement which led to the bloody battle of Mukden commenced.

Major Löffler writes: "It is no use to criticise the battle of Sandepu, for it was conceived and carried out without determination, without unity, and naturally was foredoomed to failure, against an enemy of the sticking powers of the Japanese. Had the enemy been less staunch, and the advance much more rapid and determined, it might have succeeded, but it was not of the kind that is likely to succeed in modern war.

"The Japanese acted differently, for, far from sitting down to a passive defence, as soon as they were attacked, they reinforced their left, and assumed the offensive themselves. They seem to have put in altogether three or four divisions, but the distances were so great, that not all the men of these took much part. Had the Russians continued a day longer in the positions they had gained, without moving in the rest of the field, they would have been outmatched on their right, and probably had their right wing destroyed. Fortunately for themselves, they retired in time, though it would have been better for them had they fought in a determined way all along their line."

These criticisms are no doubt just, but do not give sufficient credit to Grippenbergh. The Japanese were undoubtedly to some extent surprised, and the position on the 28th was favourable to the Russians. On that day, however, the Japanese brought in so many more men that the chance was gone. Nor was it the fault of his subordinates that Kuropatkin lost his chance. The X. Corps struck in on the initiative of its own commander. It would seem that Kuropatkin was thoroughly demoralised. Some rearrangements in the command of the various Russian Armies was made after this battle.

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Battle of Sandepu Hokutai



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
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CHAPTER VIII

THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN AND FINAL MOVEMENTS

AFTER the repulse of the Russians at Sandepu, both sides resumed the general positions of their winter quarters, but the quiet was not for long. The 3rd Army from Port Arthur was arriving to reinforce the Japanese, and a 5th Army was formed under Kawamura.

The long winter halt had been well utilised by the Russians to replace casualties to personnel and material, and to bring new corps to the front.

They occupied a front of about 50 miles, divided among three armies.

1st Army—Linievitch—I. European, II., III., and IV. Siberian Corps.

2nd Army—Kaulbars—Rifle Corps, VIII., X., European and I. Siberian Corps.

3rd Army—Bilderling—XVII. European V. and VI. Siberian Corps.

Besides Cavalry and mixed detachments under Mistchenko, Rennenkampf, Alexieff and Burger.

General Reserve, XVI. Corps.

Total, about 310,000 men (allowing for sick and

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casualties), and 1,200 field and mountain guns. There were also a large number of heavy guns and howitzers, probably about 250.

The IV. European Corps was on its way to the front.

The Japanese occupied a somewhat less extended front, with the wings refused.

They were divided into 5 armies as follows:—

1st Army — Kuroki — Guard, 2nd, 12th Divisions. Two Reserve Brigades.

2nd Army — Oku — 4th, 5th, 8th Divisions. Three Reserve Brigades.

3rd Army — Nogi — 1st, 7th, 9th Divisions. Two Reserve Brigades. One Brigade Artillery.

4th Army — Nodzu — 6th, 10th Divisions. Three Reserve Brigades. One Brigade Artillery.

5th Army — Kawamura — 11th and 1st Reserve Divisions.

Cavalry Division — Two Cavalry Brigades.

General Reserve — 3rd Division. Three Reserve Brigades.

Total—	13 Active Divisions.
	1 Reserve Division
	13 Reserve Brigades
	2 Cavalry Brigades
	2 Artillery Brigades.

The Reserve Division was formed under the law of 26th September, most, but not all, of the Reserve Brigades were "mixed," *i.e.*, brigades of all arms.

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The strength of the "Kobi" and "Yobi" troops is not at all accurately known, but the Reserve Brigades were strong bodies, stronger than an Active Brigade, and were often employed as separate bodies from the Active Division.

The companies had been brought up to from 280 to 300 strong, and there was very little sickness. The total strength therefore available was at least 310,000 men, with 900 field and mountain guns, and about 200 heavy guns.

The two forces were therefore numerically fairly equal, but the Japanese had a slight preponderance in infantry, the Russians a great superiority in cavalry and in artillery.

The lines occupied by the several forces prior to the commencement of operation were:

Russians.

Section 1—Sifantai—Shantan—Pausentun,
Held by Kaulbars with the Rifle VIII. X. Corps,
I Siberian Corps in reserve.

Section 2—Pausentun to north of Shahopu,
Held by Bilderling with V. Siberian and XVII.
Corps, VI. Siberian in reserve.

Section 3—Putiloff and Novgorod Hills by
Kandolisan, as far as the Kautulin Pass,
Held by Linievitch with I. European, IV.
Siberian, II. Siberian, III. Siberian.

The right flank was covered beyond Sifantai by Mistchenko with a division and a brigade of Cossacks and a brigade of Infantry.

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The left flank was covered by Rennenkampf, and further still east was Alexieff's mixed force of a division of Infantry and a division of Cossacks at Sinhoshon.

General Reserve at Mukden, and a detachment of a brigade of the XVI. Corps and a brigade of Cossacks, under Burger, was sent north along the railway early in February on account of the enterprise of two squadrons of Japanese cavalry, who worked round the Russian right.

The Japanese held a line through Ponsihu—Bianyupusa—Fyndiapu (1st Army), thence south of Shapopu to the railway (4th Army), thence to Sandepu (2nd Army).

About this time (early February), the right of the line was occupied by Kawamura (5th Army), while Nogi's army and the General Reserve were about the railway from Liauyang northwards.

Both sides had fortified the fronts, particularly along both banks of the Shaho to an extent that turned the lines almost into fortresses.

The Russians had further constructed a second line about Mukden and eastwards along the right bank of the Hunho, as far as Fushun, and westwards by Niusiantun.

Kuropatkin had decided to take the offensive again, but Oyama was ready first, and forestalled him. By the 18th February Kawamura's 5th Army was concentrated and made the first movement. Marching up the Taitseho on the 23rd, he

attacked Alexieff at Sinhoshon, which, after desperate fighting, had to be abandoned by the Russians. The Japanese pursued, and succeeded in occupying the Dalin Pass on the 25th. Alexieff retreated on Matsiundan, where, uniting with the other troops guarding the Russian left, he successfully maintained himself against Kawamura.

On the 21st Kuroki had moved, and on the 24th the 2nd Division attacked the Kautaulin Pass, and Sekorei which lies further east; the 12th Division attacked Tungou, while the Guard further west attacked Yansintse and Fyndiapu.

Linievitch successfully resisted all these attacks. The 2nd Division was itself outflanked and in difficulties, but the intentions of the Japanese head-quarter staff were fulfilled. They had filled the mind of Kuropatkin with fear for his left. Perhaps that is why Kawamura's two divisions were called by the grandiloquent name "Army." Kuropatkin was also further prepared to fear for his left, which lay in the mountains, in which, for some reason, the Russians believed that the Japanese fought to peculiar advantage.

Thus deceived into believing that all the Port Arthur troops were attacking his left, Kuropatkin called the I. Siberian Corps, $\frac{1}{2}$ 6th Division East Siberian Rifles, and the 72nd Infantry Division over to the left, and put Rennenkampf at the head of the troops, amounting to fully the strength of an Army Corps, which were at and about Matsiundan.

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On the 27th February Nogi, who had concentrated about Liaobeiho, crossed the Hunho and marched north-west in four columns with his left shoulder up, and his left flank covered by cavalry. On the 28th he was in line, and on the 1st, pivoting on Sifantai, he commenced a great right wheel. On this day the Japanese Cavalry Scouts entered Sinminting, a commentary on the efficiency of the Cossacks, who outnumbered the Japanese Cavalry, on this flank by 3 to 1.

Kuropatkin heard of Nogi's movement on the 27th February, and on the 28th reinforced his right with such of the XVI. as he had left, and on the 1st March ordered the I. Siberian Corps to counter-march to Mukden to form a new General Reserve. He also ordered Kaulbars to draw back his right (Rifle Corps and VIII. Corps), and ordered the I. European and XVII. Corps to provide a mixed division for the General Reserve. On the 27th Nodzu cannonaded the Russian front, and the 10th Division commenced approaches against the Putiloff and Novgorod Hills.

Kaulbars' change of front commenced on the night 1st-2nd March, and seeing the movement, the 9th Division furiously but unsuccessfully assailed Sifantai. The movement, protected by rear-guards, was continued the next day and during the night 2nd-3rd, closely pressed by Oku and Nogi. The gap between Oku and Nodzu, caused by Oku's movement, was filled by a detachment from the 4th

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Army. During the 2nd a determined but unsuccessful counter attack on the 1st Division was made by the Russians from Salinpu.

On the 3rd Nogi held back the 1st and 7th Divisions for the arrival of the 9th Division. The counter attack from Salinpu was renewed, but beaten off. Oku continued his wheel to get into line with Nogi, the Russians south of the Hunho forming a line through Linshinpu—Paidiantsu—Tasudiapu—Yeltaisa, which was prolonged north from Fuhudiapu through Salinpu.

Meanwhile the battle was fairly even along the front of the 4th Japanese and 3rd Russian Armies, and swayed to and fro with attack and counter attack along the remainder of the line. The I. Siberian Corps reached Mukden on the 3rd.

On the 4th Oyama had given orders for Mukden to be reached and the line of retreat cut, but it was soon found that the Russian line was stronger than had been expected, and Oyama was forced to use the 8th Division, which reached the line from the Hunho to Ninguantun, while the 5th Division was opposite the old railway embankment south of the Hunho. Although Nogi was unable to make much progress, Oyama did not give up his intention to push his left on. In front of the south and east portions of the line there was not much fighting, though there was heavy cannonading. Kuropatkin on this day placed the troops south of the Hunho, facing Oku, under command of General Launitz;

they consisted of the bulk of the Rifle Corps, VIII. Corps, V. Siberian Corps, and apparently a demi-brigade of the X. Corps. The rest of the X. Corps were apparently drawn back to form a general reserve under Kuropatkin's orders. As Oku had forced back the V. Siberian Corps past Tasudiapu, the XVII. Corps (right of Bilderling) was ordered to form a front, facing south-west, along the railway. For the 5th Kuropatkin designed a great counter attack and gave the following orders:—

The attack was to be made in 3 columns:

Right Column—I. Siberian Corps; Brigade X. Corps; Brigade of XVII. Corps; a Regiment I. Army Corps, to advance on Diakiu-Yandiatun against Nogi's left.

Centre Column—25th Infantry Division, to advance on Shandiasa-Shansintun.

Left Column—Remainder X. Corps; Regiment VIII. Corps; 5th Rifle Brigade; some battalions 2nd Rifle Brigade; Regiment V. Siberian Corps, to advance on Ninguantun Tasediapu; Mischenko's Cossacks to work round the Japanese left; a Reserve of two Regiments to assemble at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

The curious jumbling of units is noteworthy, and it was probably on that account that the troops were not ready at the hour named, and Oku took the offensive on both banks of the

Hunho. This induced Kuropatkin to order the counter attack to stand fast, but seeing that his south front held its own, he ordered it to take place next day. The Japanese 3rd Division on Oku's right made some progress, as did Kuroki; otherwise not much was done during the 5th. On the 6th, under cover of 160 guns, the Russian counter attack was made, but although the cannonade began at dawn the infantry did not move off till 11.0. Nogi was making some alterations in the position of his troops; but the desperate resistance of one battalion of Japanese checked the Russian right column, and though Oku and Nodzu could do nothing with the Russian south front, and the time was exceedingly propitious for a resolute Russian offensive, the attack was hardly pressed, and by early afternoon the Russians were in retreat.

On the 7th the Japanese Cavalry endeavoured to effectively cut the line north of Mukden, but were foiled. The remainder of Oyama's Reserve, 3 Reserve Brigades, were by this time up in rear of Nogi's Army, and were drawn up to the left wing. The 1st Division succeeded in reaching Tavitun and temporarily interrupting railway and telegraphic communication. Elsewhere the Russians on the whole held their own, a brigade of the 3rd Division, which reached Yahuntun and penetrated the Russian line, being cut to pieces; but by evening south of the Hunho the Russians were right back to the railway embankment. A counter attack against the Japanese

Guard failed. At 8.0 p.m., however, Kuropatkin issued orders to the south front to retreat to the line of the Hunho. Already, on the 6th, preparations for this had been made, and the heavy guns evacuated.

Linievitch's Army carried out their retreat on to the line of the Hunho in good order, but Bilderling, who was in closer touch, and the portions of Kaulbars' Army south of the Hunho were not so successful, though, as they were not hotly pursued, they crossed the Hunho safely, while rear-guards occupied the bridge-heads, which had been previously fortified. Although the retreat was clearly visible, Kuroki alone made any determined effort to pursue on the 8th. The 1st Division (left of Nogi) made ineffectual efforts to cut the line; the rest of Nogi, Oku and Nodzu all advanced, but not far. It is not clear what became of the 3rd Reserve Brigades. On the 8th Kuropatkin determined on retreat to Tieling, and ordered the 1st Army (Linievitch) to provide 48 battalions for a rear-guard. The details of the retreat are still only very vaguely known, and it is sufficient to say that the stubborn resistance of the rear-guards enabled the bulk even of Kaulbars' and Bilderling's Armies to escape, the main loss in prisoners (12,000) occurring mostly among the Rifle Corps and VIII. Corps under Haunefeld, who had been defending themselves against Oku, and were now retiring when they were cut off by the 6th Division (Nodzu). Such, in the

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briefest outline, were the outstanding features of the series of operations called the Battle of Mukden. The Japanese loss was 41,000; the Russian loss was probably 65,000 killed and wounded, with 19,000 prisoners and 58 guns.

There cannot, however, be said to have been a pursuit in the sense of pressing a beaten foe until he loses all cohesion, and his retirement degenerates into a *sauve qui peut*, such as that of the Prussians after Jena and Auerstadt, the French after Vittoria and Waterloo, or even the Austrians after Königgratz.

So tired out by the fighting were the Japanese, that, though a few advanced troops followed close on the heels of the Russians, the main body only advanced slowly. In the early hours of the morning of the 14th, the Japanese were engaged on the Fañho, south-west of Tieling. The main headquarters remained at Gunshuling.

On the night of 16th-17th March the Japanese occupied Tieling, and on the 19th Kaiyuan. By this time they were quite worn out, and when their advanced troops reached the line from Peiuanpumen to Shantufu and westward they could get no further.

From the 23rd a new standstill, only broken by unimportant outpost and patrol skirmishing, fell upon the theatre of war.

The Russians retreated with great rapidity to Tieling, and thence to Harbin.

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When studying carefully the Battle of Mukden, one fact seems to stand out prominently, and that is that it was Marshal Oyama's personal tenacity of purpose that brought the victory to the standards of the Mikado. German theorists are wedded to the idea that the General-in-Chief should have but little influence, or rather should *use* but little influence, once the forces are engaged. It is his function, in their idea, to bring the troops to their places, and there he is to leave them to fight it out. No doubt the telephone and field telegraph help to weaken the necessity for non-interference, even since the times of Königgratz and Gravelotte St. Privat.

The great movement of the battle was, of course, Nogi's march and change of front. Yet though it was this movement which led to the collapse of Kaulbars' Army, and that finally led to the Russian defeat, the desperate fighting by Nodzu, Kuroki and Kawamura, had every bit as much to do with the final success, and it was due to Oyama that their attacks, which, being of necessity holding attacks, would naturally tend to become weaker, did not lose their sting, and thus, though the advantages gained by these armies were small in amount of ground gained, were nevertheless fruitful in success. Kuroki's vigour on the 8th and 9th undoubtedly hastened Kuropatkin's decision, to retreat on Tieling and abandon the struggle round Mukden. General von Cämmerer, in particular, criticises

Oyama's disposition, and the severe fighting by the 4th and 1st Armies most unfavourably, and says that by the 7 days' fighting they gained nothing; but on what grounds he ventures to make this assertion it is difficult to find out. It is impossible to hold an enemy without coming to grips with him, and this both Nodzu and Kuroki undoubtedly did. General von K  merer, at the same time, says that Nodzu's Army might have approached the Russian position with pick and shovel in a systematic way, or if the ground was too hard with sand-bag work, etc. As it happens, this is the way in which Putiloff and Novgorod Hills were attacked.

In all Von K  merer's criticisms on Oyama's operations, it would almost seem that he was trying to find mistakes. For instance, he objects to the position of Nogi's Army at the time of the concentration for the battle, *i.e.*, behind Oku, and says that only one consideration can be urged in favour of such a plan, and that was to conceal the position from the Russians. This reason would appear to the ordinary mind to be a sufficiently good one, in view of the position and situation of the Russian Reserves, and the fact that the Japanese were only equal to the Russians numerically, and *must* hope, or at any rate try, to surprise them. It was Oyama who ordered Nogi to push on on the 4th, in spite of the Russian counter attacks against his flank, and Oyama who filled the gap between Oku and Nodzu. It would seem that the German non-

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interference idea is exaggerated, and undoubtedly Oyama's personal resolution and magnetism kept the spirits of his army up, and finally led it to victory.

This point has been laboured to some extent on account of the difference in the trend of the criticism on the Battle in Germany and France. On his side, too, Kuropatkin was no M'Clellan at Sharpsburg, and his hand was ever on the reins. Probably he interfered too much, and his penchant for collecting odd regiments and battalions into improvised brigades would upset even British Regulars, accustomed as they are to constant changes, much more Continental troops, who are not habitually treated in this way.

The enveloping movement of the Japanese only partially succeeded, and might at any time have failed had either the Cossacks on the right shown any real energy, or Kuropatkin held a strong general Reserve in hand to fling on the flank of the flank attack. Every writer on the battle, without exception, has pointed to the fact that had Kuropatkin held his Reserve back, say, at Wusytai Station, making it to consist of 2 corps and a cavalry division, and had he refused to be deceived by Kawamura's offensive, that Nogi's attack could itself have been taken in flank, and must have failed. But here, as everywhere else, Kuropatkin only attempted to parry Oyama's stroke; he never forced his own course of action on to his opponent.

Still here, as elsewhere, Kuropatkin proved a master of the difficult art of retreating. The retreat was a wonderfully successful bit of work, and proves that the staff work of the Russian Army was much better than many people would have us believe.

The hopeless ineptitude of the Cossacks was further demonstrated. Nogi's movement was covered by a cavalry division, altogether inferior in strength to the Cossack Division, under Mischenko, guarding the Russian right. What a chance for a dashing cavalry leader with good troops! The country was ideal cavalry country, open, rideable anywhere, and the rivers frozen.

Kuropatkin was replaced in the command by Linievitch on the 17th March, but returned for a short time and took command of the 1st Army.

Both armies took up defensive positions, and the Russians were still further reinforced. The 3rd and 4th Rifle Brigades arrived, and the whole 5 Rifle Brigades were increased to the footing of divisions.

The IV. Army Corps was sent to the Far East.

The mobilisation of 4 more corps commenced, the XIX., IX., XIII., XXI., and by the 10th August the XIX. Corps was already arriving.

By the end of September the Russians would have had 60,000 men in Vladivostok, and 600,000 men on the theatre of war besides.

The Japanese meanwhile strained every nerve to reinforce their Field Army, but by the end of September they could not possibly have collected

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more than 450,000 men to oppose the Russians, who could certainly have had available for field operations 500,000.

On the 27th May, in a battle in the Straits of Tsuchima, Admiral Togo annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet under Rozdestvensky.

During July and August certain minor operations took place in the island of Sakhalin, in which the Japanese were uniformly successful; there were also occasional brushes between the outpost lines, and the Russians and Japanese detached troops in North Korea, also another raid by Mischenko, but these operations are of small importance.

That the Japanese would have been eventually driven back had the war continued is just possible; that they could have advanced further almost impossible, but the Russian bolt was shot. Internal disorders at home, and constant failure in the field, had weakened their credit almost to breaking-point, while the Japanese also began to realise that the drain on their resources would soon become unendurable.

Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States, invited the Czar and the Mikado to send peace plenipotentiaries to America, to discuss a possible basis for peace; the proposal was accepted, and on the 5th September, peace was eventually signed.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan secured all the advantages for which she had fought, except that only half the island of Sakhalin was ceded

back to her, while Russia gained time to endeavour to heal the disorder at home.

The war was in a way unique, for it was a long-drawn-out fight between two powers in the territory of a neutral. Except Sakhalin, the Japanese never entered real Russian territory, for Port Arthur was only leased to her.

CHAPTER IX

GENERAL NOTES

BEFORE commencing to enumerate some of the lessons to be deduced from the war, it may be as well to mention that, in spite of statements occasionally published, the customs of war usually observed between two civilised powers were rigidly observed by both sides in Manchuria. There seems to be no doubt but that, with the exception of our own conduct of the war against the Boers, there has never been a campaign conducted, in which the principles of humanity have been more rigidly observed by any nation than by both sides in the late war.

At present the data to establish the number of the killed and wounded, sick and missing, on either side are incomplete; but it would seem that while the Russian Medical Staff was overtaxed, the Japanese Medical Staff was entirely adequate, and managed in such a way as to excite general admiration. The Japanese soldier is naturally clean, and was animated by so extraordinary a patriotism, that when he had once understood the principles of hygiene on which his health depended, he observed them rigidly, without supervision, in order that he might not unfit himself to take part in the struggle in the field.

The severe strictures that have appeared on the Russian medical arrangements appear to be quite unfounded. Far from this being the case, it would appear that though occasionally heavily taxed they were on the whole admirable. The figures officially published show an extremely small percentage of deaths from wounds or sickness. In September, 1905, there were over 50,000 officers, nurses and men employed in the Russian Medical and Red Cross service at the front. That hygienic principles were observed, is shown by the fact that men for water duties were attached to each unit as is now done by us, that there was no epidemic, and an extremely low percentage of admissions to hospitals; naturally, however, not so low as that in the Japanese Army.

On both sides the soldiers each carried a portion of a bivouac tent, but whereas the Russian soldier was made to carry throughout the campaign a cumbersome and often temporarily unnecessary kit, better arrangements were made by the Japanese.

Ordinarily, both sides marched carrying their knapsack and equipment, but when going into action the Japanese soldier discarded his knapsack and went into the fight with a rolled cloak over his left shoulder and a cloth bag over his right, in which were rations for perhaps two or three days, and about 200 extra rounds of ammunition, bringing the total amount of ammunition with which he entered the fight up to about 350

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rounds. With a spare pair of socks and a piece of soap in his haversack, he was able to get along for several days in this way, until after the engagement was over his knapsack and kit were brought up by the transport.

It would appear difficult to devise a more satisfactory arrangement, but it must not be forgotten that in the long marches incident to the campaign, and common to any campaign, the Japanese soldier carried his pack, in order not to increase the already burdensome weight of transport dragging at the tail of the marching columns.

The Russian soldier received a ration of rye bread and meat, and vegetables were sometimes issued, sometimes to be obtained in the country. Each Russian Company is provided with a field kitchen on wheels. This excellent and simple contrivance enables a meal to be cooked while the troops are actually in motion. It is recorded that there was never a road so bad, or a march so long, but that the travelling field kitchen could keep up. This arrangement appears difficult to excel.

The Japanese soldier can live for days on rice, and this undoubtedly helped the commissariat arrangements of the army wonderfully. His ordinary ration consisted of rice, fresh meat or dried fish, vegetables, oil, and sometimes spirits in the form of saké. No European troops, however, could march and fight on such a diet.

The Russian is a good horsemaster, and treats his animals with kindness, in marked contrast to the Japanese, who is said to be a poor horsemaster, and to have but small knowledge of horses. As the horse is a but little used beast in Japan, this is not to be wondered at. The Cossack horses are said to have been poor.

The Japanese Supply and Transport Services have been already referred to. In more detail it may be said that each division was self-contained, and had in addition to the regimental or 1st Line Transport; a Train, 1 Battalion; Stretcher-Bearers, 1 Battalion; Ammunition Supply, 1 Battalion.

The former 2 battalions are kept at skeleton strength during peace time, and instruct 4 batches of recruits as drivers every year, thus building up a very large reserve force. This train is under a special intendant officer. The Ammunition Supply Battalion is formed in a similar way, and is under the officer commanding the artillery.

The Stretcher-Bearers are formed of reserve soldiers under combatant officers, and a medical staff is attached. The Field Hospitals are formed under the train officers as far as transport goes.

The system of training drivers for the train duties was found to work well on the whole, but the Japanese transport cart was very bad, and had to be largely replaced by purchased Chinese vehicles.

Behind the Divisions was the Army Supply

arranged by etappen stages. That is, great depots were formed and pushed up towards the fighting columns, and from these depots the Divisional Transport refilled.

The Russian Transport arrangements do not appear to have been so good. Light tramways were largely used, but the supply of cart transport for the troops to march with seems to have been inadequate, although 150,000 ponies were bought in Manchuria and Mongolia. It is said that all the resources of the Russians were so fully employed in supplying the troops from the railway, that large scale offensive operations were rendered well-nigh impossible.

This is probably exaggerated, but points to a serious deficiency.

Of especial interest to ourselves is any information that can be obtained about the Japanese Sea Transport and methods employed, and times taken to embark and disembark the men, horses, guns, waggons and stores.

The voyage was a short one, four days at the outside, so that elaborate preparations had not to be made, but it may be remarked here parenthetically, that still slighter preparation of the ships need be made, for the transport of troops for a trip only twenty-four hours or less, such as from Germany or France, to England.

The transports employed by the Japanese were almost entirely Japanese vessels, often commanded

by an English captain with a Scotch chief engineer, and varied in size from 6,000 to 2,500 tons.

The horse-stalls were of the roughest description, merely rough planks and boards nailed together, which could be, and were, put up in a few hours by ordinary carpenters.

Guns, waggons and stores were carried in the hold and shipped in the ordinary way. The horses were generally slung on board with the ship's steam derricks.

It appears that on a 6,000 ton ship from 1,200 to 3,000 men and 250 to 300 horses would be taken.

As far as possible a unit would ship complete. Thus a transport would take a battalion and a battery with all the 1st Line Transport, besides supplies.

The troops were disembarked in sampans carried by the transports. These sampans are large flat-bottomed barges, about 30 feet long and 9 feet beam drawing 6 inches of water when loaded. Each sampan had its gear complete, and special davits had to be rigged to carry them.

A sampan would take from 30 to 40 men each, or from 4 to 6 horses.

A few lighters were also towed by the transports when going to a new debarkation point. If it was intended to continue using the point for debarkation of troops, the lighters would be left. These lighters would take 100 men or 15 horses.

The horses were slung out and the men went out

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by gangways. The horses all had grass shoes, which prevented slipping while on board or during embarkation or disembarkation.

It was found that with practice a ship could clear itself of men in three to four hours. Were the roadstead sufficiently large, it is evident that any number of troops, for which transports could be provided, could land on an open shore in this time. The landing of supplies and stores would obviously be a longer matter.

The quantities of ammunition expended by both sides reached enormous figures. In South Africa we had experience of the rapidity with which ammunition is fired away, and there is no doubt that in this respect the data of the Russo-Turkish War of '77 are more valuable than that of the Franco-German of '70-71. During the Battle of Mukden a Japanese Division is said to have drawn 1,483,200 cartridges from the ammunition column. Allowing that the men went into action with 270 cartridges, this means that they required practically 400 each for the battle. During the fighting at Liauyang on the 30th and 31st August the 34th Regiment of Siberian Rifles required 1,200,000 rounds, or 300 rounds per man per day.

The artillery of the Russian 35th Division during the battle of the Shaho, 12th-15th October, used in the 4 days 30,000 rounds, *i.e.*, over 800 rounds per gun.

These figures speak for themselves, but it would

appear that our regulation quantities at and in front of the advanced depot are barely sufficient. Nor are the figures quoted, though among the largest given, by any means exceptional.

In the sap work in front of Port Arthur and in the Russian defences, bullet-proof shields of about a square foot superficies were extensively employed. For the purpose of destroying entanglements and obstacles, it has been suggested, both by Continental and English writers, that some sort of portable shield would be invaluable. Such a shield must be easily portable, and the volunteers for obstacle destroying would take them on from the final position from which the assault was to be delivered.

Grenades, both hand and rolling, were extensively employed by both sides in front of Port Arthur.

The Russian electric land mines proved practically ineffective, though naturally nerve-destroying, and therefore valuable to some extent as tending to upset the morale of the attackers.

The Japanese used in their advanced trenches small wooden mortars of 5-inch calibre. They fired explosive and incendiary grenades of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. weight with the fuse. Various driving charges were used to give a more or less extensive range, the maximum being about 300 yards.

It is said that they also had a 7-inch wooden mortar, though details as to its range and capacity are not obtainable.

The engineering work on both sides was remark-

Engines
able for its excellence ; the bridges were sometimes pontoon, but generally trestle bridges. That over the Hunho River at Mukden, for instance, was a quarter of a mile long and 10 feet wide. It was built of wooden trestles, secured by wire hawsers. The Russian field works were of the most elaborate kind, every device being utilised to make them secure. They generally consisted of three lines : the Outpost Line, the First Line of Resistance, and the Second Line. In the outpost line deep trenches, like those constructed by the Boers at Magersfontein, and rifle pits were used. In the other lines, redoubts of strong profile, connected by trenches and covered by entanglements, abattis, trous de loup and other obstacles, were constructed. During the latter phases of the war, the attacking force entrenched itself as it advanced, and to do this almost every man carried an entrenching tool of some sort. In a Japanese Company two-thirds of the men had such a tool.

Behind the great lines that were constructed, boom-proof shelters for the supports and reserve were made, which served as huts for the men to live in, and a light railway provided inter-communication.

On both sides, the endurance shown by the rank and file was most remarkable. It has been said that the greatest military virtue is to cheerfully endure and show courage under the stress of extreme fatigue, and this virtue both sides displayed

in a marked degree; this characteristic was most noticable in the Russian troops, which, disheartened as they must have been by constant defeat and retirement, and without any real enthusiasm in the quarrel, nevertheless showed a good front always, and never lost their morale to any dangerous extent.

This brings us naturally to the characteristic of the Campaign that has perhaps been most talked about in Continental Military Circles, and that is the fact that no battle of the Campaign ended in a long sustained general pursuit.

Nothing could have exceeded the crushing nature of the defeat at Wafangou, yet it did not end in disaster to the Russians. After the Yalu, a couple of battalions and a battery were cut up, and after Wafangou the fire action of a Brigade of Cavalry and long range artillery fire caused some loss to the Russians, but generally speaking, the rear-guards were able to hold the enemy at arm's-length.

At Mukden it is true that the Russian right was overwhelmed, but no attempt was made to pursue and destroy the remains of the beaten Russian Army.

It may be that this must be put down to the fatigue consequent on several days of protracted fighting, or to lack of sufficient mounted troops, or to the caution which marked the Japanese movements from first to last. Possibly the fact must be put to the credit of all three reasons, or as Meunier puts it: "Did Napoleon pursue after Eylan,

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after Fredland, after Wagram, after the Moskowa?" The fact is, the Russians are difficult people to pursue, it would seem.

Defence

On the Russian side the ordinary tactical procedure was to occupy and strongly entrench a position, and after holding it passively till dark to retire to another one further back under cover of night. In the scheme for the occupation of their positions, the idea of, and the careful preparation for, a grand counter attack was always lost sight of. Such tactics could not lead to victory; they might help to gain time, but to help towards the grand object of war, the destruction of the enemy, they were of little real value.

Night
work

Marches and advances were constantly made by night by both sides, and this aspect of modern war must not on any account be lost sight of. Towards the end of our Boer War, marches were constantly made by night, but advances to attack a position under cover of night have never been resorted to with such frequency in any previous campaign as in this one by the Japanese, both in Manchuria and before Port Arthur. In Chapter IV., the Japanese strategy up to the time of the Battle of Liauyang was considered, and the criticism, voiced by Löffler, which has been generally adverse to the Japanese, was explained. The mistake was over-caution, but it may be doubted if the critics of the Japanese strategy have given enough prominence to the fact that the Japanese are

an Asiatic people, and that for centuries every meeting between Europeans and Asiatics has resulted in the discomfiture of the latter, however great the numerical odds in their favour. It must have been of inconceivable importance to the morale of the Japanese Army that there should be no defeat, or even repulse in the early part of the war.

There is, however, one point in which the Japanese General Staff must be blamed, and that is the way in which the 7th and 8th Divisions were retained at home until October. There is no more certain maxim of strategy than that for a decisive battle every man and every gun should be brought into the line. If they were not at Liauyang, then they should have been in front of Port Arthur, to ensure that as soon as possible the Field Troops detained by the Fortress should be set free by its capture to join the Field Army.

Many a blunder has been made by the British, particularly during the time of the Napoleonic Wars, in this way. But the Japanese constitution admits of military affairs being managed by trained strategists, not as in our case, by more or less distinguished politicians; and there seems to be no doubt that it was the fault of the General Staff that these two fine Divisions were made to kick their heels in idleness in Japan, instead of taking their places in the line.

An extra division in Marshal Oyama's Reserve

at Liauyang might, if thrown fresh into the fight of the 2nd September, have overwhelmed the rear-guards, and converted a retreat into a disaster.

Lastly, there can be no doubt that the siege of Port Arthur was entered on light-heartedly and without any idea of the opposition that would be met.

Of the Russian strategy there is not much to say. To fight on the Yalu and at Telissu were strategical blunders, apparently forced on Kûropatkin by Alexieff or St. Petersburg.

The force necessary to overcome the Japanese was ridiculously under-estimated; 6 Army Corps and 2 Cavalry Divisions, besides Lines of Communication Troops, proved so inadequate, that when peace was signed, notwithstanding the heavy losses of the Campaign, 14 Army Corps and 6 Cavalry Divisions were at the seat of war, besides the Garrison and Lines of Communication Troops, and 2 more Army Corps were on their way, and two more mobilising. That is to say, that Russia had recognised the necessity of employing not 6 but 18 Army Corps.

General Kuropatkin's strategy was probably otherwise, though not brilliant, yet correct, until the time came to join battle, then, though at and after Liauyang he always equalled or outnumbered his opponent, yet Oyama always managed to collect a superiority of force at the decisive points.

Reference to the fact that the Russian tactics

never contemplated a counter attack has already been made; it was the same with the Russian strategy. Glued to the knowledge that time would give him great superiority of force, Kuropatkin constantly fell back to meet his reinforcements.

His orders of the 2nd October and 19th January, 1905, show that his only idea was to become numerically superior; he was always looking for his lines of retreat, always regretted having to take the offensive. As a consequence the Russian offensive was always weak. At Liauyang the defeat of Orloff's Brigade caused Kuropatkin to break off his counter attack, at Mukden a single battalion delayed one column of his counter attack, and again he gladly gave it up. He was always ready to let his adversary choose whether he would go in first or put the other side in.

That Liauyang may have been too advanced a place to choose for the first decisive battle is not the point; it may have been so, or it may not. The fact remains that the Russian strategy, like their tactics, was dictated to them by the Japanese.

General Negrier says: "The Russo-Japanese War has shown again that it is offensive strategy alone that gains the day. An army obliged, by political consideration, or inferiority of number, to remain on the defensive, must defend itself by constant counter attacks. It was thus in 1814, which will for ever remain the model for such strategy.

"Napoleon, while he manœuvred between the allied armies, always acted on the offensive. His numerical inferiority never was allowed to force him to take up a position. Bar-Sur-Aube, Craonne, Laon, Rheims, Saint Dizier, were all offensive actions."

Meunier says of Kuropatkin's strategy that it must be noted that the spirit in which the Russian strategy was conceived was much less due to Kuropatkin's own personality than to the military education he had received in his career. He further puts this down to :

1. An exaggerated belief in the power of fire-action and the intrinsic value of ground.
2. Confusion between offensive which is an attitude, and attack which is an action.

And ascribes the trouble to the teaching of Dragomiroff.

Kuropatkin was always harping on his desire for exact information of the enemy's movements, and considered an offensive impossible without that. Exact information is impossible in war. In consequence of this, Kuropatkin was always endeavouring to obtain information by means of advance guards, and reconnaissances in force, and advanced positions. Modern arms are well suited to prevent such means of obtaining information being successful, as is very well pointed out by Meunier.

The Japanese had a system of attaching a General Staff Officer from headquarters to army

commands, and from army commands to divisions, to assist the subordinate staff in carrying out the superior's orders in the *sense* intended as well as to the letter.

Before leaving the question of strategy, it should be pointed out that the Press Correspondents and Military Attachés were put into quite a new position by both sides, but particularly by the Japanese. We have had a lesson in the proper way to treat the Press Correspondent, and it is to be devoutly hoped that the lesson will be learnt by us; and that he will be relegated to his proper place in the scheme of military creation, should we again become involved in a great war, or even a little one like the Boer War, in which the publication of news and ignorant criticism can do great injury to ourselves.

The failure of the Cossack Cavalry has been remarked upon in Chapter IV. The Japanese Service of Security is thus well described in a French report dated from Liauyang, July, 1904:—
“Mixed detachments of strength, varying from 20 to 40 troopers, with from a half to 2 companies of infantry, formed a screen round the Army that was nearly impenetrable to the Russian Cavalry. Sometimes these detachments were provided with artillery. In the mountainous country of the Yalu, the Japanese thus occupied every hill, every pass, every road, and again in the south, in the month of June, they occupied thus 36 villages from Pitzevo

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to Polandian, forming a screen which kept their movements concealed from the Russian Cavalry, and prevented any attempt to gauge their strength."

It was behind such a screen that, on the 14th of June, the Japanese deployed their forces south of Wafangou, and hid completely the turning movement which rolled up the Russian right next day.

Detachments of cavalry which succeeded in passing these posts found their retreat blocked, and rarely escaped with any information of value from the infantry of the advanced Japanese detachments. On the other hand, some patrols of 4 or 5 men succeeded in escaping the vigilance of the enemy, and provided most useful information to the columns. As a result of this system of mixed detachments, the Russian Cavalry, superior in numbers, in horsemanship, and in horses, never got a chance of using lance or sabre; yet it is safe to say that since the first skirmish, there was never a day that the Russian Cavalry were not in action on foot with the carbine.

General Négrier insists very strongly on this aspect of cavalry use during the late war, and points out how invariably the action of the cavalry had to be with the firearm, never with the *arme blanche*.

General Négrier writes:—"We must at once admit that the Russian Cavalry proved bold and active, and if they failed as a result of unsuitable

organisation in the duty of procuring information on the other hand they performed the duty of keeping touch and guarding the army from surprise movements with great success." By General Négrier's own showing, this was not always the case, for the movement of the Japanese 4th Division at Wafangou was not discovered by the cavalry, or if it was, the news was not given at all, or given in such a way as to be considered doubtful.

However, General Négrier goes on to instance the handling of Samssonoff's Cavalry after the Battle of Wafangou as peculiarly interesting.

"After the battle the Russian force, which formed the I. Siberian Corps, had to retire hastily, at first by two night marches on to Wantselin, then on to Sainontchon, and thence to Kaiping. General Samssonoff, an active, vigorous man of 46 years of age, regained contact on the 16th June, the morning after the battle. His cavalry followed the rear-guard of one brigade and covered it by outposts 4 miles from its main body. On the 19th June his force consisted of 2 Regiments (6 squadrons) of Dragoons, 6 sotnias of Siberian Cossacks, 3 sotnias of Frontier Guard troops, a Commando (such is the term used in the report) of mounted Scouts from the 13th Regiment of Siberian 'Chasseurs,' the 3rd Battery Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery.

"The squadrons were from 80 to 90 sabres

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strong, the sotnias 90 to 100. The duty was most arduous, for this cavalry in action, day and night, could not find time for rest. Samssonoff asked for a force of infantry for night outpost duty; he was told that he must remain between the enemy and the rear-guards of the Infantry Columns. On the 20th of June, 7 officers' patrols were despatched, and a turning movement by 3 battalions and 2 batteries was reported. General Samssonoff sent off all his baggage, keeping only a few pack animals. The outposts were fighting all through the night. At 2.20 a.m., they mounted again, and slowly withdrew. The Japanese advanced in 3 columns, the strength of which could not be exactly determined; their cavalry remained under the protection of its infantry; that is to say, the columns continued to cover themselves in march as in camp, by a screen of mixed detachments of Troopers and Infantry, which the Russian patrols could not pierce. Some few officers' patrols obtained information, and also a few Chinese spies brought in news. On the 23rd the withdrawal continued without fighting, except that a troop hidden in a fold of the ground succeeded in destroying half the horses of a squadron of Japanese Cavalry, which had dismounted to fight on foot. On the 24th, the withdrawal continued as on the 25th and 26th; on the 25th, 12 officers' patrols were sent out, and on the 26th, Prince Jaime de

Bourhon led a portion of the I. Siberian Corps on a reconnaissance towards Senoutchen. Three sotnais marched at 3.30 a.m. to join this force, and a force of 3 squadrons of Japanese Cavalry were met with, who retired on Senoutchen, where, according to Chinese spies (the only means of information that could be found) there were 12 squadrons and 3,000 Japanese Infantry.

"On the 27th Samssonoff was ordered to attack Senoutchen. He started at 3.30 a.m., and delivered his attack on foot. His artillery was powerless against the village, and the attack failed. At 9 a.m. he withdrew. On the 28th he withdrew to Baovitai, a point several miles south of Kaiping. There was no further movement till the 6th July. The weather was very bad, yet in spite of fatigue, and the fearful state of the roads, the troops retained their morale perfectly. On the 1st, infantry took up the outposts, and the cavalry could rest. Thus the cavalry of Samssonoff took 23 days to give up 35 miles, sometimes withdrawing, sometimes advancing a little, always in touch with enemy, and following his movements, but never able to obtain sufficient information on which to base a scheme of operation.

"It was often 20 miles south of the Infantry Columns, and its difficulty was increased by the fact that the commander of the force often fixed the line of its outposts, and even its places of bivouac, although between the time of the trans-

entirely repugnant to the feelings of the English people, who, speaking generally, use the smallest amount of secret service money of any power. There are three things in which the cavalry's duty to the army lie—first, keeping contact and obtaining information; secondly, attacking the communications; thirdly, assisting when the forces have joined battle.

We have seen how both sides managed the first duty. There were several examples of the second duty during the war. In the early days of February, 1905, 2 squadrons of Japanese Cavalry cut the railway far away to the north. The actual cutting of the rail had but little effect, but fear for the communications induced Kuropatkin to send a Brigade of Infantry northwards, and to retain a large body of Cavalry Troops that might have been usefully employed in the line of battle. The right time for the enterprise was taken—that is, just when the battle was joined, and had therefore some effect. Reference has been made to raids by Mistchenko and Rennenkampf from the west and east flanks of the Russian forces in their lines of the Shabo, in the Japanese communications.

The last thing to consider in connection with the cavalry, is the use to which Russians put their great force when battle was actually joined. The action of the cavalry at the Battle of Mukden will serve as an example. It will be remembered that, briefly,

the course the battle took was that Oyama massed the 3rd and 5th Armies behind his left and right wings. This action was not unnoticed by the Russians. Oyama then attacked by his right, and the Russians reinforced their left with part of their general reserve. Oyama then attacked strongly by his left, and after several days' very hard fighting, destroyed the Russian right army under Kaulbars. The centre and left then fell back.

General Negrier states that one may certainly place the indifferent use of the cavalry among the chief causes of their defeat.

"As a matter of fact, it seems certain the Russian headquarters made sure that the Japanese would attack in the mountains. Russian reports show that the Russians firmly believed that the Japanese Army knew themselves to be inferior in the plains. Why they held this extraordinary opinion since the battle of the Shaho, it is impossible to say, but it seems certain that it was the case, and this preconceived idea was acted upon with disastrous results.

"As far as we can tell from the reports, it was not till the 7th March that Kuropatkin was informed by his cavalry that the troops pressing round his right were much more than strong detachments. Yet Nogi had moved certainly by the 27th February, and Kuropatkin's right wing had been actually dislodged and forced to form a new front on the 4th March.

"At the beginning of the action the bulk of the

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cavalry was in 3 groups—1 on the east flank, 1 on the west flank, and 1 right away to the rear; the rest was frittered away in keeping open communications between the armies, etc. Nogi's Army from Port Arthur (3 Active and 1 Reserve Division) had formed behind the Japanese left, and apparently on the 26th February his advanced echelon, consisting of 6,000 cavalry, a battalion of infantry, and some artillery, marched north on Sinminting and drove in the Russian Right Flank Cavalry. Nogi's columns followed in echelon from the left, with the column referred to leading. On the 3rd, Nogi, covered by this column and mixed detachments, was able to form for attack, and on the 4th the Russian right was virtually already defeated.

"It appears then that the great force of Russian Cavalry did nothing. Yet had they been collected in great masses, they could have acted like Sheridan's Cavalry at Five-Forks. An army in the defensive must keep a large reserve, and what more properly belongs to it than the cavalry?

"Suppose 5,000 to 6,000 had been behind Kaulbars, with a brigade at Sinminting, 4,000 behind the left and left flank guard, and 8,000 at Mukden. Then Nogi's advance could have been checked by the cavalry of the Russian right and General Reserve, 13,000 in all, and time given to re-form the Russian right to meet the new situation.

"Again, even later, when the Russian right was

already defeated, the Japanese pushed a force of cavalry and artillery through the gap between the right of Bilderling (centre) and the left of Kaulbars, and it was this force that accounted for the bulk of the prisoners. A reserve of cavalry of even 4,000 men could have filled the gap and saved this loss, even if it could not have saved the battle." It is said that the Japanese felt the want of horse artillery.

With regard to the artillery lesson of the war, it is really not much new to us that has been arrived at.

The all-importance of cover has again been clearly demonstrated. Cover from view is of more value than artificial cover, but the value of indirect shooting is not generally so great as that of direct shooting. There are certain points that have appeared, and of these the most important is that changes of position are well-nigh impossible during the course of a modern battle until the end is near.

That the original position shall be the best one, and that best suited to the tactical requirements, has become an even more important point than before. Both sides used, if possible, to entrench their guns in positions from whence a full view of the field could be obtained over the sights; if, however, time or opportunity did not admit of elaborate preparation, indirect fire from behind natural cover of the ground was always employed.

The Russians, as has been already stated, used

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the new Q.F. Gun on a long recoil carriage. Long bursts, or even short bursts, of rapid fire were, however, but seldom employed on account of the weight of ammunition expended. Of course, when a target offered, the "Rafale" was used for a short time, but opportunities apparently seldom offered.

The Japanese gun was out-matched by the Russian, and though the earlier battles were, as in the case of Telissu, decided practically by the Japanese Artillery, later the balance turned the other way, and at Tashichao the invisible Russian guns held the Japanese attack at bay all day. At this battle General Negrier states that 3 Russian batteries fired 7,402 rounds. One battery (8 guns) fired 4,008 rounds, equal to 501 rounds per piece.

The Russian gun only had shrapnel, the Japanese had high explosive common shell as well. The high explosive shell was found to have very little effect on troops or earthworks, though effective against villages.

It is said that the Japanese would have found use for more heavy guns, and particularly heavy howitzers. The driving of the Russians was, of course, far superior to that of the Japanese, who are said to be poor horsemasters and riders, and no doubt the constant failure of the Japanese Artillery to closely support their successful infantry was due to want of skill in driving, or of resource among the officers and men in extricating their

guns from difficult places, and moving them over difficult country.

The absence of horse artillery on the Japanese side was severely felt, or at any rate was noticed by all the military attachés. The Russian Cavalry, however, was so ineffective that the Japanese did not suffer much from the lack of this arm; as, however, they were often apparently barely able to get their field guns along, it is unreasonable to suppose that they would have done much good with horse artillery.

The mountain artillery of the Japanese did yeoman service, and often proved invaluable. The 12th Division, which was armed with this form of artillery, was invaluable during the Battle of the Yalu and the subsequent advance.

The necessity for elaborate signalling arrangements, field telephones, etc., and also for intelligent look-out men provided with telescopes and able to send messages by signal, has been abundantly manifested during the war. Also, the vital necessity to keep communication between the artillery and infantry whom the guns are supporting. The Japanese carried flags to indicate where their firing lines had got to, and artillery officers in some of the later battles accompanied the infantry attack. The dissociation between the artillery and the other arms does not assist the British Army to improve their arrangements in this direction. The unfor-

tunate competitive system of our artillery practice camps further militates against a proper conception of the duties of the artillery as an auxiliary arm, particularly in the minds of the lower ranks. Under our present system everything in the artillery turns on the practise camp results, and a battery's efficiency is judged almost entirely by them, but at the practice camp there are no infantry.

That the power of Q.F. Artillery must not be over-estimated was shown on many occasions; for instance, during the battle of the Shaho, a Japanese brigade doubled across an open space, swept by a Russian battery at 1,500 yards almost without loss, and not in partiucularly loose formation. Yet the Russians appeared to have had both range and fuse.

Gun shields have been described by, I believe, every authority as a vital necessity.

The march of the Japanese columns is thus graphically described in Russian report, dated 21st July, 1904, quoted by Negrier:—"In front of the troops march Chinese spies, who examine the ground with the utmost care, for any failure in reporting results is instant death. For this purpose the Japanese capture a Chinese family, and holding some members as hostages, despatch the rest as spies"—and so on . . . "Behind the spies come small patrols of cavalry, accompanied by infantry. Thus for 3 or 4 troopers there are 4 or 5 foot soldiers. When the cavalry trot, their shadows, the foot

soldiers, run behind them. Behind the patrols come the front detachments, followed by small columns at great intervals. Generally the bulk of the cavalry march behind these advanced guards, and serve as escort to the guns. When a detachment chooses a position, on hearing from the spies that the enemy are near, the advanced guards deploy in long chains on the position. Then the columns march up and entrench. The work is quickly done, ranges to conspicuous points and to likely places of position, for the enemy are accurately found. The whole foreground is divided into squares on a plane table sketch, and these plane tables are placed in every trench for officers and men to become acquainted with the positions and distances of principal points. The sappers dig communicating trenches, make roads and put up the telephones, and make signalling stations. Heliographs, fires, smoke, flags, and lamps are used for signalling, etc."

The above description is probably a good one of the wonderful methodicalness, to coin a word, of the Japanese military methods. Their tactics have been described as aiming to keep up a continued pressure, never giving way a foot, and always advancing when a chance offered.

The Russians were firmly convinced that every Chinaman was a Japanese spy; as a matter of fact the Russians employed as many Chinamen as they could get in the same capacity.

In the earlier battles the Japanese used the

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regulation formation of Continental armies. Their losses were severe, and their formation soon began to resemble those in use by us since the Boer War. That is to say, they learnt to "advance slower and take cover." Another Russian report says: "The Japanese make use of the cover afforded by the ground to perfection. During the battle one never sees the movements of their reserve, or even of the firing line. . . . The Japanese use their Reserves to strengthen their firing line. . . . In the actual hand-to-hand attack they endeavour to cover the bayonet attack of one section by the magazine fire of another. . . ."

A French Military Correspondent thus describes a Japanese Infantry attack on the 31st August in front of Liauyang by a part of Oku's Army: — "Comfortably installed behind great rocks, we looked out across the plain. Suddenly, on the other side of a dip, a thin yellow line appears. It is Japanese Infantry, who have put their knapsacks on the ground and commence the attack. For this attack the line has been divided in parties of a dozen to a score of men, each under the orders of an officer or non-commissioned officer. Each of these parties has been allotted a point in the enemy's line which it must reach; it is the only order it will receive. The first line leaps from the trenches, the leaders of parties dash to the front, running with all their might up to the nearest shelter which the ground

affords, where they throw themselves down flat. Their parties follow without attempting to keep any order, each man's sole thought being to get to the shelter as quickly as possible. I fix my glasses on one of these groups. It first crosses a field of corn, without being noticed by the enemy, but now it comes into a field of roots. The yellow dots dash forward. A man falls, gets up, staggers a pace or two, and then falls again. Two others fall beside him, and a fourth, wounded tries to get back to shelter, but also falls by the other 3 wounded men. Soon in front of the Russian position appears the swarm of khaki dots, nearing it by jumps. The men follow the leader, and the leader chooses the cover and the road to it. Often a group will follow another group for a few hundred yards to avail itself of good cover, and then resume its own general position in the alignment. Now all the original symmetry of line is lost, and some of the groups are running, others lying, others crawling or just getting up. Thus the 1,000 yards to the obstacles covering the Russian defences are covered, and here at last the line halts and forms itself under shelter of a bank, stupidly raised by the Russian to cover the obstacles from artillery fire. When the first line was half-way to the obstacles, a second line leapt from the trenches, and followed the first in the same way, and then a third. In all, six lines successfully followed the first, and sheltered in the cover of the little bank. Mean-

while volunteers were rushing out by twos and threes to cut the wire of the entanglements. Seldom did these heroes get back unscathed. Now the fire on either side is getting hotter and hotter, and men on both sides are falling fast. But one cannot hear the whistle of the bullets or the rattle, and roar of the musketry, for excitement in the drama that is going on about 1,000 yards from where we lie. The whole Japanese line gleams with the fringe of steel of the bayonets. It is the last phase. Once more the officers spring out from the friendly cover with a shout of 'Banzai,' taken up by the whole force. They move forward with difficulty, but yet surely, in spite of the barbed wire, and the trous de loup, and the merciless fire. Whole parties are wiped out, they are replaced by others; the flood abates momentarily, but always advances. Then the long grey line of Siberian Riflemen gets up in its turn and doubles down the reverse slope of the mountain, while covering forces of the Russians pour a hail of bullets on the pursuing Japanese."

The form of attack thus graphically described resembles that now in force in our own Army most closely. Our Army is recently experienced in war against a people armed with modern weapons of precision, and has very little to learn in actual minor tactics from this war. Probably, as far as technical training of the lower ranks goes, no army in the world is the superior of our own. The

all-importance of musketry to the infantry man had been recognised by the British Army before any Continental Army, and there is no doubt that though the shooting of our troops left much to be desired in 1899, it was in a class above that of any foreign army. Our artillery has always been about the best in Europe; and though our cavalry, owing to training difficulties, used not to be so efficient in reconnaissance work as cavalry officers wished, yet the average of horsemanship was, and is, higher than that of other powers. The importance of visual signalling had been for years understood in the British Army. What, then, have we to learn? There are two points of technical training which this war has brought into more prominence than the South African. The first is the necessity for the use of the spade in the *Attack* as well as the defence; the second is the necessity to practise night attacks, or rather approaches to a position during the night, as well as night marches. Among the most important things which one notices that hardly come under the head of technical training, are the difficulty of supplying Q.F. guns with ammunition in a battle of several days' duration; the fact that battles are of several days' duration, and that the men must go into action prepared for this; that so large are the bodies of troops collected in sometimes small areas, and often for days, while a great combination is preparing, that billets cannot be found, and therefore some sort of

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shelter tent is a necessity ; and lastly, that the lines taken up whether defensive or offensive, are so long that visual signalling is not sufficient, and some system of field telephones must be devised. But above all the lessons of the War, one stands out pre-eminently ; it is, "Be Ready." The nation that has a military policy thought out and calculated with mathematical accuracy by a highly-trained general staff, working on scientific lines, is bound to have the advantage over another even slightly less prepared. The gallantry and high technical skill of its troops will not of itself avail. It would be interesting to know how many officers were employed at Tokio to work out plans for the war with Russia during the years between the Chino-Japanese War and 1904. How many officers do we employ in this purely strategical work? Yet the Japanese could only have to fight in one direction, while our world empire may call upon us to fight in a dozen different countries.

APPENDIX.

TABLE I.

THE JAPANESE ARMY IN 1904.

	Bat.	Squ.	Baty.	Round Numbers.
Guard	12	3	6	14,000
1st—6th				
8th—12th				
Inf. Div.	132	33	66	154,000
7th Inf. Div.	12	3	9	14,000
1st and 2nd				
Cav. Brig.		16		2,400
1st and 2nd				
Field Art.				
Brig.			36	7,200
	156	55	117	191,600

According to regulations there were 13 Reserve (Kobi) Infantry Brigades of 6 battalions, 1 squadron, 1 battery. The Reserve Troops, however, were made up to 8 battalions, and besides, 32 other battalions were raised.

Behind this was a Landsturm (Yobi) of 104 battalions (130,000 men).

N.B.—Japanese Batteries, 6 guns.

On 26th September, 1904, a law was passed, turning Yobi into Kobi, which brought in at least 100,000 men to replace casualties, and form 2 new Reserve Divisions.

• More active Divisions were also raised as the War progressed, and brought up to the front after the Battle of Mukden.

TABLE II.

Russian Forces.—The Theatre of War at the time
of the Proclamation of Peace.

Commander-in-Chief—Linievitch.

Chief-of-Staff—Charkevitch.

1st Army.

Kuropatkin.

Chief-of-Staff—Ewert.

I. European Army Corps.

I., II., III., IV. Siberian Army Corps.

Primorski Regiment of Dragoons.

71st Infantry Division.

One Pontoon Battalion.

One Balloon Section.

Two Cavalry Divisions under Rennenkampf
(Siberian Cossack Division and Trans-Baikal
Cossack Division).

2nd Army.

Kaulbars.

Chief-of-Staff—Russki.

I. Rifle Army Corps.

VIII., X., XVI. European Army Corps.

VI. Siberian Army Corps.

1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment.

One Pontoon Battalion.

One Balloon Section.

Cavalry under Mischenko :—

Caucasian Mounted Brigade.

Caucasian Cossack Division.

Ural Trans-Baikal Cossack Division.

Orenburg Cossack Division.

Don Cossack Division.

3rd Army? Batianoff.
 Chief-of-Staff—Martianoff.

II. Rifle Army Corps.

IV., XVII. European Army Corps.

V. Siberian Army Corps.

One Pontoon Battalion.

One Balloon Section.

Two Regiments of Dragoons.

Vladivostok Defence.

 Kreshtshatiski.

 Chief-of-Staff—Rutkovski.

2nd, 8th, 10th East Siberian Rifle Division.

Three Regiments of Cossacks.

Garrisons at Vladivostok.

Six Artillery Battalions.

One Sapper

Two Mining } Company.

One Balloon } .

Garrisons at Nicolaievsk.

One Infantry Regiment.

One Artillery Company.

One Mining Company.

Garrisons at Possiet Bay.

One Infantry Regiment.

One Artillery Company.

One Mining Company.

Lines of Communication Troops.

Three and a half Regiments of Cossacks.

50,000 Boundary Watch Troops.

Eight Railway Battalions.

A number of Supply Companies.

Three Cossack Battalions of Foot.

Besides the above troops there were mobilised and in process of transportation to the seat of war—

IV., XIX. European Army Corps.

In process of mobilisation—

XXI. and XXIII. European Army Corps.

N.B.—There was also a siege train at the front, and also the 53rd Infantry Division, but it is not known to whom they were attached.

A Russian Army Corps consists of 2 Divisions, each of 2 Brigades, of 2 Regiments, of 4 Battalions, of 4 Companies.

Each Division has also an Artillery Brigade of 6 Battalions of 6 guns each.

This works out at—

Battalion	...	850
Regiment	...	3,400
Infantry Brigade		6,800
Division	...	13,600 Infantry.
		1,200 Artillery.
		Total 14,800.

Total of Army Corps, nearly 30,000.


As a matter of fact, none of the units, from the Company upwards, were ever up to strength, and the Army Corps fell sometimes as low as 20,000 Infantry.

The Cavalry Divisions were also much below

strength, and a great many cavalry were wasted in doing duty with the Divisions of Infantry

The nominal strength of the Field Troops was therefore about 500,000; 120,000 were *en route* or mobilising, therefore it would shortly be possible to take the field with at least 500,000.

THE END



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